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A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric
of "Principles-Based Systems" in
Corporate Law, Securities
Regulation, and Accounting
Lawrence A. Cunningham
60 Vand. L. Rev. 1411 (2007)
This Article corrects widespread misconception about
whether complex regulatory systems can be described fairly as either
"rules-based"or "principles-based"(also called "standards-based').
Promiscuous use of these labels has proliferated in the years since
the implosion of Enron Corp. Users show an increasing habit of
celebrating systems dubbed principles-based and scorning those
called rules-based. While the concepts of rules and principles (or
standards)are useful to classify individual provisions, they are not
scalable to the level of complex regulatory systems. The Article uses
examples from corporate law, securities regulation, and accounting
to illustrate this problematic phenomenon. To describe or design
systems as principles-based or rules-based, analysis must account
for the application and interaction of all provisions. Once these
features are accounted for, the labels become facile. The Article thus
concludes that it is neither possible nor desirable to fashion such
systems to be "principles-based" or "rules-based" and that such
misleading labels should be retired.
The Article then explores why the rhetoric extolling
"principles-based systems" is flourishing.
It considers three
hypotheses: (1) a regulatory emphasis on discretionary enforcement
to induce cautious compliance, (2) a quest to rejuvenate ethical
principles in the practice of corporate law, securities regulation, and
accounting, and (3) a deflective political strategy in jurisdictional
competition to signal product differentiation. The first and second
hypotheses are credible but suffer from both descriptive and
normative weaknesses, including how they can backfire by leading to
overzealous enforcement. The third is the strongest descriptively but
the most troubling normatively.

Politicaleffort to differentiate regulatory products using these
labels is a form of misleading advertising. This deflection not only
underscores the need to retire these labels; it also reveals a routinely
overlooked limitation of jurisdictionalcompetition in corporate law,
securities regulation, and accounting.
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INTRODUCTION
Many people seem to believe that legal or accounting systems
can be either "rules-based" or "principles-based." 1 The scandalous era
epitomized by Enron Corp. drew worldwide attention to these labels.
Many attributed the scandals to weaknesses in the United States
accounting system, which they classified as "rules-based."2 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the Securities and Exchange Commission

1.
The phrase "standards-based system" is also used. See infra text accompanying notes
10-18.
2.
E.g., Written Testimony ConcerningAccounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by
Enron and Other Public Companies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/032102tshlp.htm (asserting that U.S. accounting is "based on
rules, and not on broad principles"); S. REP. No. 107-205, at 13 (2002) (stating the reasons why
Congress chose to conduct a feasibility study regarding the use of a principles-based accounting
system); FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., PRINCIPLES-BASED APPROACH TO U.S. STANDARD
SETTING,
No.
1125-001
(2002),
available at http://72.3.243.42/proposals/principlesbased-approach.pdf [hereinafter FASB, 2002 PROPOSAL] (proposing a principles-based approach
to standard setting to improve the quality and transparency of financial accounting and
reporting); see also Stephen C. Gara & Craig J. Langstraat, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: A
New Ballgame for Accountants, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 73, 93-94 (2003) (noting the possible
downsides to the U.S. rules-based accounting system that were recognized by Congress when
passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act); Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other
Trick Plays: The Book.Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 161-62
(2003) (analyzing the desire of Congress to study the feasibility of a principles-based accounting
system); Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 394, 421 (2004) (stating that the plethora of "technical disclosure rules" makes
financial fraud easier); William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin, 58 BUS. LAW. 961, 965 (2003)
(noting the financial world's "ethic of technical compliance").
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("SEC") to study this claim. 3 Within and outside the United States,
policymakers seize on these categories to self-classify their legal and
accounting systems in order to use these labels as grounds for
promotion, reform, or prescription. 4 This Article contends that this
regulatory
enthusiasm
for analysis
positioned across
the
rules/principles axis is misplaced.
These classifications are too crude to describe or guide the
design of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting systems.
Inquiry concerning the nature of rules and principles demonstrates
how these labels invariably require sorting individual legal or
accounting provisions onto a continuum rather than precisely fitting
them into two neat categories. Describing a system as principles-based
or rules-based not only would require an inventory of all its provisions
along that continuum, but also would account for how they are applied
and how they interact. Within large complex regulatory systems,
assessment of the application and interaction of individual provisions
may result in systemic qualities that differ significantly from one
based solely on an inventory of the individual provisions. Moreover, a
conscious effort to design a system to be either principles-based or
rules-based would require forcing individual provisions toward the
poles. To do so interferes with the benefits of the relationship among
rules and principles and impairs tailoring the form of articulation to
meet desired objectives.
Surveys of U.S. corporate law and securities regulation and of
U.S. and international accounting illustrate the necessity and value of
combining rules and principles and the difficulty of designing systems
warranting classification as rules-based or principles-based. All these
systems contain a blend of provisions ranging from the particular to
the general, from those providing precise ex ante instruction to those
defined after the fact. The provisions serve different ends and, because
within large complex systems they are not isolated from one another,
3.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7218 (Supp. II 2002) ("The
Commission shall conduct a study on the adoption by the United States financial reporting
system of a principles-based accounting system."); see id. § 7266 (requiring the SEC to review an
issuer's filings at least once every three years); see also infra text accompanying notes 199-201.
4.
See, e.g., Nicholas Le Pan, FinancialRegulatory Outlook, 23 NAT'L BANKING L. REV. 52,
53 (2004) (describing approach to corporate-governance regulation as addressing behaviors
through "guidelines" that "are not rules," including "boards making sure they have the
information they need in the form they need it"); Liam O'Reilly, Chief Executive, Irish Fin.
Regulator (Rialtdir Airgeadais), Address at the Institute of European Affairs Seminar on
Financial Services Regulation: Financial Services Regulation: Challenges and Burdens (June 21,
2005) (stating that the Irish Financial Regulator is "a principles-based regulator" and opposes
"rules-based systems"); Cathy Quinn, Member, N.Z. Sec. Comm'n, Address at the Legal Teachers
Forum: Corporate Governance Post-Enron (July 8, 2005) (advertising the country's "robust
principles-based framework for good corporate governance" instead of a "more prescriptive rulesbased approach").
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they are mutually informative. Thus, corporate fiduciary duty laws
bear principle-like attributes but interact with statutes and form a
doctrinal structure with rule-like attributes through repeated
applications in non-statutory contexts. Anti-fraud principles in
securities regulation and measurement principles in accounting
interact with individual rules requiring specific disclosures and
classifications to produce a coherent body of legal and accounting
provisions.
Yet global rhetoric increasingly speaks of the availability of
systems denominated as principles-based. As countries develop
corporate laws, debate centers on whether they should be formulated
as rules-based or principles-based. 5 U.S. federal securities regulation
is routinely criticized as rules-based, while the Canadian system is
heralded as principles-based. 6 Around the globe, many characterize
the U.S. accounting system as rules-based while calling the
international accounting system principles-based. 7 Within the United
States, regulators and compliers alike invoke such language when

5.

See, e.g., STOCK EXCH. OF THAIL., THE PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

FOR LISTED COMPANIES (2006), available at http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cg_
principles-thailand_2006_en.pdf (setting forth non-binding principles and best practices);
William Baue & Graham Sinclair, JohannesburgSecurities Exchange Requires Compliance with
King II and Global Reporting Initiative, SOCIALFUNDS.COM NEWSROOM, July 16, 2003,
(describing the Johannesburg
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article174.html
Securities Exchange as "principles-based," not rules-based, so as to "encouragef directors to
perform in the spirit of the code rather than simply applyo the tick box approach"). The Task
Force to Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada commissioned a study from me which
initially asked which is superior, a rules-based or principles-based system of securities
regulation, and ultimately involved elucidating some of the main characteristics of securities
regulation in the United States and Canada. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Principles and Rules in
Public and Professional Securities Law Enforcement: A Comparative U.S.-Canada Inquiry, 6
CANADA STEPS UP 253 (2006), available at http://www.tfmsl.ca/docs/V6(5A)%2OCunningham.pdf.
6.
E.g., Allison Dabbs Garrett, Themes and Variations: The Convergence of Corporate
Governance Practices in Major World Markets, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 161 (2004)
(saying that many of Canada's provinces, such as British Columbia and Alberta, employ a
principles-based system of regulation); Ruth 0. Kuras, Harmonization of Securities Regulation
Standards between Canada and the United States, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 465, 472 (2004)
(noting the differing factors between the United States's and Canada's economies that contribute
to the selection of a rules-based or principles-based approach).
7.
See Frederick Gill, Principles-BasedAccounting Standards, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 967, 973-80 (2003) (discussing the differences between rules-based systems and principlesbased systems as set forth by the FASB); see also Matthew A. Melone, United States Accounting
Standards: Rules or Principles?The Devil Is Not in the Details, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1161, 116465 (2004) (describing the various bases for proposed accounting reform in the United States);
Herv6 Stolowy, Nothing Like the Enron Affair Could Happen in France(!), 14 EUR. ACCT. REV.
405, 406-08 (2005) (reviewing responses to Enron Corp.'s fraud among French accounting
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers); Kenneth Yong, Exploring Rules-Based and PrinciplesBased Accounting Standards, ACCOUNTANTS TODAY, Nov. 2004, at 32 (international accounting
is "popularly considered as being principles-based" while U.S. GAAP is "branded with a rulesbased reputation").
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campaigning for favored provisions 8 or championing state versus
federal primacy in regulating public corporations.9 Overwhelmingly,
rhetoric vaunts "principles-based systems" and denigrates "rulesbased systems."
Why this enthusiasm for principles-based systems, even
though delivering them is improbable? The Article explores three nonexclusive hypotheses. One possibility, the regulatory hypothesis, is to
provide a counterweight to strong systemic forces that demand and
produce provisions bearing rule-like characteristics. This response
expands enforcement arsenals and thus can elicit more cautious
compliance. While this explanation for the language is credible, four
limitations appear-two that question its normative desirability and
two its descriptive accuracy.
Normatively, this strategy can induce excessively cautious
compliance outlooks that impair the benefits of rules and backfire as
unfair or illegitimate if enforcement is biased towards principles
without sufficient ex ante regulatory guidance in rules. Descriptively,
the hypothesis is weak because the demand for rules always is offset
by regulatory use of principles to fortify enforcement arsenals. In
addition, the rhetoric does not speak of a balance of principles and
rules but trumpets "principles-based systems" and derides "rulesbased systems."
A second possibility, the ethical hypothesis, is that the proprinciples rhetoric reflects a desire to promote ethical values rather
than a concern for the form of articulated legal and accounting
provisions. What the Enron-type frauds showed was not so much the
danger of rules, but the manifest violation of a different set of
principles addressed by business and professional ethics. This
interpretation suggests that the language is ultimately a call for
policymakers to emphasize those ethics, and for targeted actors to
abide by them. While also credible, two qualifications appear, one
descriptive, one normative.

See, e.g., Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Release
8.
No. 8732A, Securities Act Release No. 54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A,
71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,165 (Sept. 8, 2006) (adopting a less rules-based and more principlesbased system of executive compensation disclosure, meaning disclosing all material items,
whether or not they "fit squarely within a 'box' specified by the rules"); Cynthia A. Glassman,
Comm'r, SEC, Remarks Before the Tenth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute: Priorities and
Concerns at the SEC (Mar. 9, 2006) (reporting her effort in 2003 to make management's
discussion and analysis disclosure less obscure by adopting an SEC "interpretive release that
provided principles-based guidance").
See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism:
9.
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BuS. LAW. 1, 13-22 (2005) (arguing that the flexibility of state
laws may prove preferable to the inflexible federal preemption of corporate law).
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Descriptively, such a call to ethical rejuvenation implicitly
assumes a decline in ethics during the relevant period, which may or
may not be justified. Normatively, this strategy could backfire.
Exhortations to abide by the spirit of laws project a moral appeal that
may be desirable. But rhetorical stories of principles-based systems
could produce belief that rules can be subordinated or eliminated,
which, ensuing analysis suggests, is neither possible nor wise.
A third possibility, the political hypothesis, views proponents of
principles-based
systems as attempting
to
signal product
differentiation in jurisdictional competitions designed to maintain or
expand authority. This is the most convincing explanation as a
descriptive matter. Under this account, Delaware judges promote
their state's corporate law as principles-based to forestall increased
federal regulation, which they criticize as rules-based. British
Columbia advances a principles-based system to challenge Ontario's
dominance in Canadian securities regulation. Officials who claim that
their country offers principles-based systems do so to signal a
sufficiently mature state to honor principles without the need for
detailed rules. International accounting promulgators promote their
product as principles-based against the U.S. version, which they
rebuke as rules-based, to gain leadership in establishing the global
accounting system.
Although the political hypothesis is descriptively appealing, it
is normatively troubling. If it is impossible to devise principles-based
systems, then promoting them is misleading. In addition to
undermining the hortatory aspirations of the ethical hypothesis, it
exposes a negative byproduct of jurisdictional competition that results
in such linguistic overstatement. This potential for misleading
rhetoric has been overlooked in the literature concerning jurisdictional
competition. Explicitly recognizing it not only supports retiring the
misleading labels; it also identifies a new limitation on the efficacy of
jurisdictional competition.
To reach these conclusions, the Article proceeds in three Parts.
Part I reviews the literature on rules and principles, revealing
considerable tension concerning matters of classification and tradeoffs, as well as of labeling. Extending this literature from individual
provisions to entire systems, discussion justifies skepticism about
whether it is feasible to describe or design a system as principlesbased or rules-based.
Part II focuses on corporate law, securities regulation, and
accounting. It first surveys major substantive provisions in these
fields to demonstrate the presence of a range of provisions, from rules
to principles, whose application and interaction frustrates simplistic
characterization of the systems as rules-based or principles-based. It
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then reviews proposed system designs that illustrate how even
conscious efforts to avoid having an interactive mixture of provisions
do not succeed.
Part III considers three possible explanations for the
fashionable rhetoric extolling principles-based systems in corporate
law, securities regulation, and accounting. It explores the hypotheses
that attribute this phenomenon to promoting regulatory capabilities or
ethical values and summarizes their descriptive and normative
weaknesses. Analysis of the hypothesis that political factors explain
the phenomenon is shown to be the most descriptively accurate, but
normatively the most troubling. Not only does this hypothesis add a
reason to doubt the virtue of jurisdictional competition, it also cements
the case to retire as misleading use of the labels rules-based and
principles-based to describe legal or accounting systems.
I. THE DYNAMICS OF RULES AND PRINCIPLES

Rules and principles are individual forms of articulation
constituting components of larger regulatory systems that, to varying
degrees, enable regulators to communicate expectations and provide
people with guidance about what is required or permitted. Legal
scholars continually struggle to delineate the categories of individual
rules and principles and assess their relative merits. The difficulties
associated with the treatment of individual provisions multiply when
attempting to analyze the characteristics of the larger complex
regulatory systems of which the individual provisions are fragments.
This Part reviews some of the extensive literature, using the analysis
as evidence that it is impossible and undesirable to design a system
fairly characterized as principles-based or rules-based.
A. Treatment of Individual Provisions
The following subsections discuss the literature concerning
treatment of individual provisions as rules and principles. Rules and
principles are best conceived as residing along a continuum according
to a provision's relative vagueness. The choice of form along that
continuum poses subtle trade-offs, such as between promoting
certainty by providing guidance ahead of action versus promoting
contextual analysis by evaluating action after it occurs. The ensuing
section shows that the difficulties of treating individual provisions
multiply when addressing large complex regulatory systems.
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1. Labels
A preliminary difficulty in the literature concerning rules and
principles concerns labels which, many scholars observe, are fraught
with ambiguity and confusion. 10 Scholars often use a simple polarity
concerning driving regulations to illustrate two alternative
expressions of a legal or accounting provision. One formulation
provides specific directives defined ex ante (such as a 55 miles-perhour speed limit), while another provides general directives whose
specific content is defined ex post (such as to drive at a reasonable rate
of speed). Scholars assign different labels to such illustrations.
The first formulation invariably is called a rule. The second is
susceptible to discordant labels. Some legal scholars call the
formulation a standard,1 while others refer to it as a principle or use
both terms interchangeably.12 Some scholars who use the term
13
principle do so to denominate the animating purpose of a stated rule.
In turn, some scholars use the word standards to capture both rules
and principles. 14 Others reserve the label principles for the different
idea of background justifications for laws or other commands (whether

10. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules and Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559 n.2 (1992) (discussing the confusion in the use of the terms "rules," "principles," and
"standards"); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 382 n.16 (1985) (stating
that "rules" and "standards" do not have "fixed meanings"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57-59
& n.231 (1992) (describing the ambiguity among the terms "rules," "principles," and "standards").
11. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-28, 71-80 (1977) (differentiating
"principles, policies, and other sorts of standards" and asking whether rules really are different
from principles); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles:A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTL.
J. LEGAL PHIL. 47, 47 n.1 (2002) ("[S]tandards are norms written in a way to measure
performance."); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22-25 (1967)
(expounding upon the use of "rules," "principles," and "standards").
12. See Sullivan, supra note 10, at 58 n.231 (describing the use of terminology among
Professors Dworkin, Schauer, and Radin); see also Kaplow, supra note 10 ("Outside the debate
over formulation of the law, the terms ['rules' and 'standards'] are often used interchangeably.").
13. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 22, 26 (defining a principle as a "requirement of justice or
fairness or some other dimension of morality" and as a factor "that officials must take into
account, if it is relevant, as a consideration inclining in one direction or another"). The concept of
principles as performing an animating function derives from Dworkin's theory of 'law as
integrity" that "instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties . . . expressing a coherent
conception of justice and fairness." RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986). According to
Dworkin, "[w]hen a judge declares that a particular principle is instinct in law, he reports ... an
interpretive proposal: that the principle both fits and justifies some complex part of legal
practice, that it provides an attractive way to see, in the structure of that practice, the
consistency of principle integrity requires." Id. at 228. For a deeper discussion of the different
roles of principles and rule in the 'law as intergrity" theory, see id. at 225-58.
14. This is the dominant approach in the accounting literature. See Mark W. Nelson,
Behavioral Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards, 17 ACCT.
HORIZONS 91, 91 (2003) ("A 'standard' is the total body of principles and rules that apply to a
given accounting issue.").
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rules, standards, or something else). 15 Increasingly, analysts use the
label standards to denote a measure of performance or conduct, often
established by non-governmental organizations (as in Internet
16
standards or credit rating standards).
The discordant labels also emerge in practice. Corporate law's
"business judgment rule" can be seen as a broad principle-a judicial
presumption that corporate officials act with due care. In the United
States, the shorthand reference of "Rule 10b-5" is invariably used to
designate securities regulation's most vague and open-ended antifraud principles. Accounting terminology offers GAAP (generally
accepted accounting principles) and GAAS (generally accepted
auditing standards), both of which contain a mixture of provisions
fairly denominated as rules, principles, or standards.
The proliferation of contradictory labels may suggest simply
that such labels mean little. Indeed, some dismiss the confusion as
mere nominalism, which does not impair analysis. 7 However, it is
possible that the disagreement on labeling reveals something more
substantive about these ideas and how useful they are as analytical
tools. One possibility is that the categories are inevitably unstable. As
discussed below, this instability supports conceiving of the content in
the categories (rules, principles, standards) as residing on a
continuum in which these components interact so that their
substantive meaning is mutually informative.
For now, the question of terms in legal and accounting theory
requires authors to state vocabulary choices at the outset of any
analysis. As a contrast to rules, I will use the term principles, in part
because that is the commonly used term in contemporary rhetoric and
this, in turn, suggests that something more is at stake in labeling than
many suppose.1 8 I also choose the word principles rather than
standards to reflect how the latter term increasingly is used to
designate performance or conduct measures, not legal provisions that
are contrasted with rules.

15.
57-59.
16.

E.g., EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 44-45 (1994); Sullivan, supra note 10, at
See Symposium,

Owning Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1,

1-4 (2007) (presenting a

discussion of "standards" in relation to intellectual property, antitrust, and corporate law).
17. See Braithwaite, supra note 11 ("[Tlhis distinction [in the definition of'standards'] is not
relevant to the analysis in this essay.").
18. See infra text accompanying notes 298-303 (discussing how rhetoric promoting
principles-based legal and accounting systems may be related to promoting principles of business
ethics).
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2. Classification
A more important difficulty is the problem of classifying given
provisions as rules or principles. The common illustration of driving
regulations (the rule of 55 mph versus the principle of reasonableness)
is easy but incomplete. The following notes three classification
methodologies-what I call analytical, conceptual, and functionaland concludes by suggesting that these are united by the single
quality of a provision's relative vagueness.
A common analytical approach to classifying laws as rules or
principles uses their temporal orientation. It distinguishes when
content is provided: rules define boundaries ex ante, while principles
define them ex post.19 In securities regulation, brokers know that they
are not allowed to make unauthorized trades for clients (a rule), but
may not know whether other behavior exhibits commercial honor until
it is evaluated after the fact (a principle). Thus, rules and principles
are sometimes classified according to how much guidance they provide
to actors ex ante-how much certainty is provided. Notably, under this
view, both rules and principles can be either complex or simple.
A weakness of temporal classification is that the expression of
any legal provision is always ex ante, whereas its application is
always ex post. To that extent, the method only distinguishes
expressions according to whether one has been applied or not.
Temporal classification thus carries an implicit assumption that an
articulated provision can determine its future application, which it
cannot. 20 True, there may be few or mostly trivial circumstances in
which such differences between expression and application matter.
Still, temporal classification does not enable completely classifying all
provisions into discrete categories of rule and principle. Instead,
provisions offer varying degrees of certainty and thus array across a
spectrum from rule-like to principle-like.
A more conceptual classification views rules and principles in
terms of designated attributes such as their relative generality versus
specificity, abstractness versus concreteness, and universality versus
particularity. Provisions characterized by generality, abstractness, or
universality are principles, while those that are specific, concrete, and
particular are rules. Provisions bearing a mix of these attributes are
more or less principle-like or rule-like. Thus, as examples, a provision
that is general and abstract, but not universal, is principle-like, while
19. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 560 ("[T]he only distinction between rules and standards
is the extent to which efforts to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals
act.").
20. Cf. Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603, 630 (1944) (stating
that no writing can prove its own completeness).
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a provision that is specific and particular, but abstract, is rule-like.
Sub-qualities bearing on these attributes include the extent of a
provision's clarification, detail, exceptions, or limitations.
In securities regulation, the directive to exhibit "commercial
honor" is a principle because it is general, abstract, and universal. 2 1 A
broker's duty to warn customers of the hazards of penny stock
investment vehicles is a rule because it is specific, concrete, and
particular. 22 A directive that companies disclose information "on a
rapid and current basis" is principle-like because it is general and
universal, but also concrete. 23 A directive that brokers invest for
clients only in high-grade securities is rule-like because it is particular
24
and specific, but still abstract.
This conceptual approach thus results in provisions residing
along a continuum from principle to rule, classified according to how
many of the various attributes of rule or principle characterize a
provision. 25 Although the continuum metaphor has considerable
appeal, a few scholars question the usefulness or rigor of the
imagery. 26 Indeed, a limitation of this conceptual approach is that
there is no logical limit to the number or type of attributes that might
be used in the classification process. There is no crisp way to rank
their magnitude or importance. At best, the result is a classification
scheme bearing a fuzzy logic, in which intuition plays as much a role
as hard-headed conceptualization.
21. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NASD MANUAL R. 2110 (2007) ("A member, in the
conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable
principles of trade.").
22. See Exchange Act Rule 15g-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15g-2 (2007) ("It shall be unlawful for a
broker or dealer to effect a transaction in any penny stock for or with the account of a customer
unless, prior to effecting such transaction, the broker or dealer has furnished to the customer a
document containing the information set forth in Schedule 15G, Rule 15g-100, and has obtained
from the customer a manually signed and dated written acknowledgement of receipt of the
document.").
23. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (Supp. II 2002).
24. See Messer v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 847 F.2d 673, 679 (11th Cir. 1987) (determining that
an element of scienter was not necessary where advisors were prohibited from " 'engag[ing] in
any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any
client'" (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(B) (2000)).
25. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, PresumptivePositivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 823, 828-32 (1991) (using the continuum metaphor); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and
Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 604-10 (1988) (synthesizing the virtues of
"crystalline" and "muddy" articulations of legal provisions); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 57 (also
utilizing the continuum metaphor).
26. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning, Semantics, Pragmatics,and the Rational Force
of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 925, 972 (1996) (dismissing the notion of a
continuum on grounds that it conflates distinct phenomena of logic and semantics that must be
kept distinct); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 776-77 (1995) (arguing that the conception of a rulesprinciples continuum is an analytical dead-end bearing no normative significance).
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Finally, a functional approach to classifying a legal or
accounting provision as a rule or a principle considers the scope of
discretion reposed in designated actors. The more discretion a
provision reposes, the more it is principle-like, and the less discretion
reposed, the more it is rule-like. This approach is satisfactory only in
those rare circumstances involving limited groups of actors. For
example, if a provision relates only to legislatures and judges, this
approach can weigh how much discretion the legislature reposes in
judges. However, the utility of this classification declines when the
number of actor groups increases.
Provisions that purport to restrict a given actor's discretion by
rule-like precision may increase discretion in other actors. For
example, legislatively established criminal sentencing guidelines limit
judicial discretion concerning punishment. But they increase
prosecutorial discretion when making charging decisions. In
accounting, using a rule or principle to constrain or create managerial
discretion simultaneously affects the relative discretion held by
27
auditors engaged to review managerial decisions.
A weakness of all the foregoing classification methods is that
they do not necessarily enable classifying all the possible
permutations that legal or accounting provisions can assume. A large
portion of laws (and many accounting provisions) do not fit either
category, however specified, nor do some provisions readily appear to
reside between the poles. Consider factor tests.28 For example, a law
against market manipulation may be tested according to factors such
29
as the timing, frequency, and structure of given securities trades.
Similarly, corporate laws and securities regulations can use
presumptions that may be rebutted. These may or may not exhibit
principle-like or rule-like qualities. 30 An entirely different question
also arises concerning whether a provision, whatever its form, should
be mandatory or optional (and, if optional, whether declining the
31
option must be explained in disclosure).
Any approach to classifying legal or accounting provisions as
rules or principles is contestable and leaves room for refinement. Yet,
27. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 96-100 (describing how precise and imprecise standards
can constrain "aggressive," or biased, reporting).
28. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953, 963-64 (1995)
(analyzing situations where "several factors are pertinent to the decision, but there is no rule").
29. See infra text accompanying notes 163-66.
30. See Ruth Gavison, Comment, Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 727, 750-52 (1991) (discussing the rule-like qualities of two different types of legal
presumptions).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74-76 (noting how the mandatory versus enabling
question differs from the rules-principles question in context of canvassing content of prevailing
systems of corporate law).
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uniting all the varying classification methods is a kind of superordinate attribute: vagueness. Principles are vaguer than rules.
Vagueness is greater when a provision offers less ex ante guidance
because much of its definitional content is provided only ex post;
vagueness is increased by the features of abstractness, generality, and
universality; and provisions are vaguer when they repose greater
discretion in actors compared to those that constrain discretion. While
admittedly imperfect, in the ensuing discussion and analysis, I treat
provisions as classifiable along a rules-principles spectrum according
to their relative vagueness.
3. Trade-Offs
Perhaps the most difficult problem appearing in the literature
on rules and principles concerns the trade-offs of favoring one rather
than the other. While the literature acknowledges some reasonable
approximations of trade-offs, scholars still disagree about the specific
costs and benefits associated with alternative forms of expressing
individual provisions. To illustrate, consider how the legal obligations
of securities brokers should be stated as to whether to recommend a
security. One possibility is a rule-like provision that prohibits
recommending anything other than AAA-rated bonds. Another is a
principle-like directive requiring that the broker evaluate the
investment's suitability in relation to a customer's risk tolerance and
investment objectives.
The rule appeals because of its relative certainty and
predictability; the principle appeals because of its relative capacity to
exploit advantageous circumstances and possibly avoid undesirable
ones. Drawbacks include how rules can be blueprints for evading their
underlying purposes. Bright lines and exceptions to exceptions
facilitate strategic evasion, allowing artful dodging of a rule's spirit by
literal compliance with its technical letter. Rules can benefit
resourceful and informed parties (such as brokers), yet harm reliant
and ignorant ones (such as customers). 32 In rapidly changing
environments, such as securities markets, rules can become obsolete
faster than principles.3 3 Principles may promote conservatism among
regulated actors, protect other participants, and have longer shelf
lives. However, they pose problems of uncertainty and ex post

32.

See Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws: Opting Out of

Securities Regulation by PrivateAgreement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519, 562-63 (1999) (arguing

that "seemingly neutral rules" may mask social biases).
33. See Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron and the Sudden Death of "May," 48
VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2003) ("[R]ules-based tabular disclosure is quickly outdated.").
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surprise, which can impair achieving goals such as market efficiency
and public perceptions of fairness in securities regulation.
Promulgation and compliance costs vary. In general, rules are
more costly than principles to create, while principles can impose
higher compliance costs. 34 When rules enable relatively cheap
compliance, compliance is more likely. In contrast, when compliance
35
with principles is relatively costly, the risk of non-compliance rises.
The desirability of a rule versus a principle depends on the
clarity with which one can define the importance of relative objectives.
This conventionally involves determining which are more important:
predictability and certainty, or fairness and context. In general,
devaluing discretion in order to promote predictability and certainty
dictates adopting rules, while prioritizing fairness and contextual
sensitivity leads to the formulation of principles.
The choice between articulating a provision more nearly as a
rule or principle can be influenced by factors concerning prospective
predictability, and these can cut many ways. Corporate law's fiduciary
duty principles may be superior to rule-like approaches to managerial
decision-making because promulgators cannot envision all future
circumstances in which discretion is necessary to enable operational
flexibility. In contrast, securities regulation's anti-fraud principles
may be superior to rule-like approaches to disclosure matters because
a rule approach could enable evasion by being too inflexible to catch
newly conceived schemes. Accounting's reasonableness principle in
assessing contingent liabilities functions better than any rule could
because the domain of contingent liabilities is populated by a wide
36
variety of circumstances lacking predictable characteristics.
The precise trade-off between certainty and context is not
always clear. A principle can be more certain than a dense weave of
rules.3 7 A vague articulation can yield a well-understood meaning,
while a densely specified series of articulations can yield competing
understandings. For example, the Sherman Antitrust Act may be
vague when using the terms "contract," "conspiracy," and "restraint of
trade."38 But a shared understanding of the meaning of these terms
34. See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 563 (noting that the frequency of behavior and the rate of
adjudication may make rules more costly than standards).
35. See id. at 564 (stating that rules produce more compliance as the cost of learning the
law is reduced through their clarity).
36. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 93-94 (surveying how accountants interpret less precise
expressions of qualitative thresholds).
37. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Fourth Amendment: Internal Revenue Code or Body of
Principles?, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1702, 1703 (2006) (demonstrating, in the context of the
Fourth Amendment, how "principled rules provide clearer guidance to law enforcement and
citizens than arbitrary 'bright-line' rules").
3815 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 6 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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gives a more rule-like quality to the statute. While such shared
understandings may have more to do with the nature of language and
meaning than with the nature of rules and principles, language and
meaning cannot be divorced from an evaluation of the trade-offs
associated with principles versus rules.
Moreover, rules may promote certainty in a given context but
propagate uncertainty in others. Principles may promote flexibility in
given contexts, but also show "expansionist tendencies" that curtail
flexibility in others. 39 However, the alternatives are not always tradeoffs. A combination of certainty and contextual sensitivity is possible.
To provide certainty, a rule must be flexible; to be open-ended, a
principle must be stable. 40 These observations make it difficult to
contend that rules always provide more certainty than principles or
that principles always provide more contextual sensitivity than rules.
Indeed, rules may provide more certainty for contexts that are simple,
stable, and involve small stakes, but less certainty when addressed to
complex, dynamic, high-stakes contexts. 4 1 This is especially so when
new rules are adopted and subject to change during implementation
42
and evolution.
To summarize, the literature addressing rules and principles
reflects considerable struggle, especially as to classification and tradeoffs and even as to labeling. This is due, in part, to how laws (and
accounting provisions) address vast territories, pursue varying
objectives, and assume a wide variety of forms, complexity, notice
content, and production methods. True, individual provisions can be
classified along a rules-principles spectrum according to their relative
vagueness, and associated trade-offs can be worked out when
designing provisions to suit objectives. Yet the foregoing review
suggests that these are neither simple nor incontestable matters even
at the level of treating individual provisions.

39. Schlag, supra note 10, at 411-14.
40. See id. at 405-07 (noting the importance of context in determining the certainty or openendedness of rules and principles).
41.

See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 48 (1990) (citing "reduce[d]

uncertainty about legal rights and duties" as an advantage of rules over standards); Braithwaite,
supra note 11, at 75-76 (concluding that the certainty of rules is dependent upon the type of
activity to be regulated).
42. See Brett H. McDonnell, SOX Appeals, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 505, 529 (2004) (making
this point in the context of the rules-heavy Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
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B. Treatment of Entire Systems
The challenges discussed in the preceding section become
impossibly complex and contestable when one tries to describe entire
systems as either rules-based or principles-based. Descriptions of
large complex regulatory systems must assess not only the character
of all the individual provisions, but also how the provisions are applied
and how they interact. Accounting for all these factors casts doubt
upon the analytical utility of using the binary terminology of "rulesbased versus principles-based" to describe such systems.
1. Threshold
The simplest way to characterize a system as "rules-based" or
"principles-based" is to take an inventory of the form in which
individual provisions are expressed. At this simple level, a principlesbased system is one in which all, a majority, or the most important
articulations are vague, while a rules-based system is one in which
such provisions are non-vague. In considering whether such systems
are possible or desirable as a threshold matter, it is important to
provide a theoretical or philosophical foundation for favoring either.
However, it is difficult to provide such foundations. Consider
two alternative intellectual traditions that address relative
preferences for rules versus principles within a system: law and
economics and critical theories. While each may support a systemic
preference for rules or principles, this support is too limited to defend
systemic classifications of rules-based or principles-based.
Law-and-economics scholarship addressing rules and principles
is guided by a desire to detail law as efficiently as possible. 43 Theorists
seek the optimal precision of law, 44 informed by formal
characterization of associated costs. 45 An important objective in this
tradition is to promote certainty. This translates into a general
preference for stating posited law in the form of rules, rather than

43. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
LEGAL STUD. 257, 262 (1974) ("A perfectly detailed and comprehensive set of rules brings society
nearer to its desired allocation of resources by discouraging socially undesirable activities and
encouraging socially desirable ones.").
44. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
71-79 (1983) (setting forth criteria to determine the appropriate level of regulatory precision).
45. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 10, at 564 ("If the benefit of learning the law's content are
substantial and the cost ... is not too great, individuals' behavior under both rules and
standards will tend to conform to the law's commands."); see also Gavison, supra note 30, at 75152 (proposing that a decision to follow a rule should necessarily constitute a statement that the
decisionmaker thought the rule should be followed such that costs have been taken into account).
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principles. 4 6 But since principles also can promote certainty, this
analysis cannot defend a system fairly characterized as rules-based.
Indeed, contemporary
economic analysis increasingly favors
principles, especially when informed by behavioral theories that
question how much certainty rules provide as compared to
principles, 4 7 or by game theory, which explores how principles may be
better than rules at facilitating bargaining and neutralizing strategic
48
behavior.
At the other extreme, critical theories may be invoked to
support the virtues of principles compared to rules. Important work in
this tradition positions the normative forms of argument favoring
rules or principles in terms of political consciousness. A leading
illustration of this point is how arguments favoring rules can resemble
the form of arguments favoring individualism, while arguments
favoring principles can resemble the form of arguments favoring
altruism. 49 For example, arguments favoring principles include that
they can promote contextual sensitivity, and, to the extent that one
prefers the forms of argument favoring altruism, one may likewise
support favoring a legal system that uses principles whenever
possible.
Yet this methodology is merely restating the rules-principles
argument in other terms, in this case by analogy to individualismaltruism. The analysis that suggests that rules and principles reside
along a continuum likewise could be restated: people are rarely either
46. See, e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
321, 322-26 (1985) (describing property law's preference for rules which create a closed class of
assignees, allowing easier exchange than open, unidentifiable classes); Rose, supra note 25, at
590-95 (elucidating this position, but coming short of endorsing it).
47. See Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An
Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 486-87 (2004) (concluding that levels of
uncertainty can be manipulated in order to increase deterrence); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral
Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. StandardsRevisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 30-43 (2000) (stating
that an economic analysis leads to the identification of multiple factors that govern the selection
of the appropriate legal form, although it can be concluded that standards are more appropriate
than rules in this regard).
48. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1098-1103 (1995) ("[A] host of Solomonic
entitlement divisions-including liability rules and fractional property entitlements-can induce
pre-taking negotiations superior to those of undivided property rules."); Jason Scott Johnston,
Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 272-73 (1995) ("Insofar as
the law awards entitlements on the basis of an ex post determination of which party ought to
have the entitlement, ex ante private bargaining may accomplish what the ex post legal
standard desires.").
49. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (stating that individualism favors "clearly defined, highly administerable,
general rules," while altruism supports the use of "equitable standards"); see also Duncan
Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 135057 (1982) (proposing a life cycle of legal distinctions).
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purely individualistic or purely altruistic but show varying degrees of
such attributes in varying contexts. Furthermore, principles do not
have a monopoly on promoting contextual sensitivity. Rules can also
promote this virtue. Thus, as with economic analysis, this
conceptualization does not enable defending the creation or
maintenance of systems that rely exclusively or predominantly on
principles rather than rules.
2. Applications
Even if one simply could inventory the character of individual
provisions within a system to classify them as rules-based or
principles-based and defend it according to objectives such as certainty
or contextual sensitivity, this simple exercise is incomplete. Suppose
that an inventory of the individual provisions that comprise U.S.
securities regulation or accounting justifies the common descriptions
of these systems as "rules-based." To sustain that characterization for
the system as a whole would also require accounting for how those
provisions are applied (including how they are interpreted, enforced,
or suspended).
Individual provisions may be classifiable as either rule or
principle when stated as a legal norm, but they are subject to a
separate set of decision norms that govern their application. 50 For
example, a decision norm may guide judges toward either a formalistic
or instrumentalist methodology. A provision fairly classified as a rule
may retain that character when applied using a formalist (or literalist)
methodology, but may assume the attributes of a principle when
applied using an instrumentalist (or purposive or dynamic)
methodology. These two levels of definition thus complicate any claim
that a legal system is principles-based or rules-based.
These complexities can be further dramatized when comparing
descriptions of national legal systems. Consider the following example
of alternative conceptions of such systems given by Professor
Frederick Schauer:
In some legal cultures, it is generally understood that rules should be read literally, that
the appliers and interpreters of rules should not be empowered to modify the rules at
the point of application; that judges should interpret rules according to their ordinary
meaning except in the most egregious cases; and that the virtues of specificity and

50. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626-34 (1984) (proposing a separation between "conduct
rules," which provide the general public with guidelines for conduct, and "decision rules," which
seek to provide officials with guidelines for their decisions).
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predictability are more important, especially within the legal system, than the virtues of
51
flexibility in the face of changing or unforeseen circumstances.

In other legal systems, by contrast, the virtues of rule-ness and
formality are less apparent, and it is widely accepted that reaching
the correct outcome in the individual case is more important than the
virtues brought by rigid obedience to specific rules. In these societies,
the rule-ameliorating devices, rather than being scorned, are
celebrated, and rule-interpreters, rule-enforcers, and rule-appliers
who refuse to employ these devices are typically castigated with
'52
epithets like "mechanistic" and "formalistic.
Using prevailing global jargon, at least in terms of the
application of laws, the first conception might be called a rules-based
system and the second a principles-based system. Which better
describes the U.S. legal system? In prevalent global classifications,
especially in securities regulation and accounting, the U.S. system is
depicted as rules-based, while other national systems and
international accounting are dubbed principles-based. 53 Professor
Schauer continues the foregoing passage as follows:
As should be apparent, there is a widespread view, supported by some moderately
serious research, that the United States is the best example of the latter, and that most
other advanced legal systems are at least somewhat closer to the former than is the
54
United States.

Interestingly, this conclusion, which seems correct, contradicts
prevailing global classification-at least as it concerns securities
regulation and accounting. This may simply reflect that the foregoing
descriptions concentrate on application rather than initial
formulation. It also may simply mean that those subjects are special
cases (and that accounting is not law in the United States).
More generally, however, this contrast is congruent with the
difficulties sampled in the previous section concerning classification of
individual provisions as rules or principles and navigation of the
trade-offs that individual provisions pose. When positioned in the
broader context of entire systems that must also take account of the
norms of decision-making, the credible but contradictory descriptions
justify skepticism about whether "rules-based" or "principles-based"
can be analytically reliable descriptions of any comprehensive legal (or
accounting) system.
True, institutional arrangements may influence the relative
appeal of rules versus principles and shape the form that
51. Frederick Schauer, The Convergence of Rules and Standards,2003 N.Z. L. REV. 303,
319-20 (2003).
52. Id.
53. See supra notes 2, 7 and accompanying text.
54. Schauer, supra note 51, at 320.
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promulgations assume. All complex regulatory systems involve large
numbers of actors who participate from numerous vantage points.
Examples include governmental officials (who, in turn, may be
members of various branches), regulatory actors (who may be part of
government or act through other kinds of organizations such as
accounting standard setters), corporate officers and employees, and
partners or associates in professional firms (such as law or accounting
firms). Promulgations, interpretations, and applications of provisions
can occur throughout resulting hierarchies.
It would be difficult to delineate fully how the arrangementswhich also can vary across jurisdictions-influence the system's
resulting texture. But it likewise would seem incautious to generalize
a model that supposes, for instance, that a system can be classified as
rules-based or principles-based according to the level or range in a
hierarchy at which a provision assumes its characteristic vagueness or
non-vagueness. For instance, even if governmental and regulatory
promulgations resulted in systems fairly classified as principles-based,
participants down the hierarchy may nevertheless receive very nonvague rules to apply. Similarly, even rules that are non-vague upon
promulgation by superiors may require lower-level personnel to make
judgments that ordinarily appear to be problems arising from
vagueness.
3. Interactions
Beyond the crude exercise of inventorying the character of
individual provisions and the additional complexity of addressing how
those provisions are applied, one must consider the further complexity
that arises from how individual provisions interact within a system.
Adding this complexity fortifies skepticism about such systemic
labeling.
Consider the simple driving regulation illustration appearing
in the rules versus principles literature. An individual speed limit can
be stated more vaguely (a reasonable speed) or less vaguely (55 mph).
Which is better for a given roadway varies according to numerous
factors, such as traffic volume and patterns, safety, serenity, and
energy conservation. Taking account of these factors, no functional
system could establish either a rule or a principle as the law for all its
roads.
Indeed, a law designating the speed limit as 55 mph on a given
roadway implicitly endorses that as a reasonable speed. A principle
directing drivers to cruise at a reasonable speed requires assigning
meaning to the word reasonable, which would be interpreted, in part,
in relation to zones carrying a designated limit. Thus, a system of

2007]

"PRINCIPLES-BASEDSYSTEMS"

1431

driving regulations invariably contains a mixture of rules and
principles. Good examples are laws that prohibit driving faster than a
reasonable speed notwithstanding any particular posted limits, or
driving at a reasonable speed but in no event exceeding 35 mph. Such
systems in which rules and principles co-exist and interact are neither
rules-based nor principles-based.
The same interaction of rules and principles appears in
virtually any complex legal system. Consider two individual provisions
contributing to the law of insider trading within the larger system of
U.S. securities regulation. Section 16(b) provides a "short-swing profit"
rule that penalizes certain kinds of insider trading by officers and
directors; 55 Section 10(b) contains broad anti-fraud principles that
have been interpreted to prohibit insider trading by officers, directors,
and many other persons.5 6 It is possible to conceive of the rule and the
principle as substitutes.5 7 If a system contained only the rule, it could
be called rules-based, and if it contained only the principle, it could be
called principles-based. What is the proper characterization when a
system uses both, as in the United States?
The two provisions interact in complex ways that prevent
characterizing the system as either rules-based or principles-based.
The rule of 16(b) compels disgorgement of short-swing profits,
meaning gains on securities transactions by designated insiders
within a stated time period without regard to intent. 58 The principle of
10(b) makes it criminal for unspecified insiders to trade in securities
on the basis of material, non-public information. 59 The two laws share
a similar general purpose of prohibiting securities market profitmaking based on selectively available information. However, Section
10(b) advances a fairness objective in relation to external
shareholders, while Section 16(b) also advances a management
60
regulation objective in relation to business operations.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2000) (requiring designated insiders to disgorge profits from
securities transactions occurring within a six-month window).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting the use of "manipulative or deceptive devices" in effecting
fraud, manipulation, or insider trading); Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007)
(prohibiting any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security, including insider trading); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
649-65 (1997) (interpreting SEC Rule 10b-5); infra text accompanying notes 63-65.
57. See Schauer, supra note 51, at 321-25 (treating these provisions as substitutes).
58.

15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).

59.

Id. § 78j; Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.

60.

See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading DeterrenceVersus ManagerialIncentives: A Unified

Theory of Section 16(b), 92 MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2201-02 (1994) (reconciling the overall
framework); Steve Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held
Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 391, 399 (1991) (making the case that the purpose of section 16(b)
was to prevent insiders from manipulating corporate operations to induce favorable stock price
fluctuations); Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and
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The rule's designation of specific corporate insiders and
transactions promotes certainty that the principle's open-endedness
otherwise prevents. 61 In some cases, issues arising under one of the
provisions can be useful in discerning the appropriate application of
the other, as where a problem that the rule does not address is
sufficiently handled by the principle. 62 The presence of both provisions
and their interaction demonstrate the limits of the simple method of
inventorying all provisions within a system in order to classify it as
principles-based or rules-based.
Consider a broader illustration of how individual provisions
that make up the larger system of federal securities regulation
interact. At stake in contexts governed by Section 10(b) are broad
principles of materiality and disclosure. Invocation of those concepts
in one context illuminates their meaning in others, including in
contexts to which separate rules apply. For example, a fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
63
consider it important in making an investment decision.
Under that definition, rules that mandate disclosure using
mechanical tests can be understood to designate such information as
material. 64 For instance, Section 13(d) requires owners of 5% or more
of the voting power in registered equity securities of any company to

ProhibitionsAgainst Insider Trading: Why a Property Rights Theory of Inside Information is
Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 160 n.51 (1993) (book review) (arguing that section 16(b)'s
benefits not achieved by section 10(b) are promoting long-term rather than short-term outlook
among management and discouraging them from manipulating events over the short term). But
see Marleen A. O'Connor, Toward a More Efficient Deterrence of Insider Trading: The Repeal of
Section 16(b), 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 309, 358-80 (1989) (arguing that section 16(b)'s system of
deterrence is irrational and inefficient).
61. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace:A Uniform
Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 861 (1992) ("Clear and precise regulation of insider
trading would eliminate the need for section 16(b).").
62. See Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 232, 255 (1976) (stating
that while section 16(b)'s scope is unaffected by whether other sanctions might inhibit abuse of
inside information, section 10(b) addresses problems left unaddressed by section 16(b)).
63. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) ("An omitted fact is material
if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote."); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider
Trading:A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2003) (referring to materiality as "a
broadly applicable judicial standard" that requires a court to assess "the likelihood that a
reasonable investor (or stockholder) would consider a particular fact or particular information
important in making an investment decision").
64. See Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and Soft Information Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 727 (1989) ('The particular items of information mandated
to be disclosed [under SEC rules] are presumably automatically deemed to be 'material.' ").
Thousands of examples of prescribed items can be cited, including the specific requirements
found in (a) Item 11 to Form S-1 concerning the required prospectus for offering securities, (b)
Items 1-8 to Form 8-K stating events that require filing a current report, and (c) the content of
both quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual reports on Form 10-K.
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disclose specific information about their equity position and intent
with respect to corporate control. 65 Such a rule can be justified on the
grounds that investors would consider such ownership and plans to be
important as the materiality principle defines it. Section 13(d) may be
a rule and Section 10(b) a principle, but the interaction between them
creates systemic qualities that frustrate tidy categorization of the
system as rules-based or principles-based.
4. Benefits
Even if one were to decide, after taking inventory of a system's
provisions, that it is or should be "principles-based" or "rules-based,"
that those attributes are sustained through both their applications
and interactions, it would remain difficult to contend that a
commitment to those systemic qualities is desirable. At a basic level,
interactions among individual rules and principles within a larger
system can produce numerous benefits. Apart from enabling a closer
fit between form and objectives, benefits include the following.
First, interaction between individual rules and principles
within a larger system constrains abuse of power by both those subject
to the provisions and those who enforce them. Risk of power abuse
arises from principles without rules or from rules without principles.
Imagine a principles-only system, such as one stating that
public companies must "disclose all material facts" (period) or that
their financial statements must "be fairly presented" (period). How do
managers determine what to do in a given circumstance? Who decides
whether companies have complied with the principles? How will an
enforcer make the case that a violation occurred or a manager defend
against the charge? Vague concepts such as materiality and fairness
unaccompanied by some specific content create risks of both ad hoc
managerial decision-making and arbitrary enforcement. Some
specificity reflecting rule-like characteristics is necessary to give
meaning to such principles. Alone, they are vulnerable to abuse.
Conversely, imagine a rules-only system, such as a specific
schedule of required items of disclosure listed from A to Z or triggered
65. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000); see Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (emphasizing purposes of rule are to provide
shareholders with information about the bidder and incumbent management and to provide
additional information without any intention of aiding management in resisting a bid or tipping
the balance of power between bidders and managers); Exchange Act Rule 13d-1, 17 C.F.R. §
240.13d-1 (2007) ("Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership
of any equity security of a class which is specified in paragraph (i) of this section, is directly or
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent of the class shall, within 10 days after
the acquisition, file with the Commission, a statement containing the information required by
Schedule 13D.").
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by events one through ten. Absent accompanying principles, rulemakers will operate by fiat. Managers will not need to think or
exercise judgment, even when following those rules produces absurd
results. Some may even exploit the rules as blueprints expressly to
achieve such absurd results. Principles are necessary to mediate the
rules.
Second, the co-existence of rules and principles within a system
helps to assess its coherence. The concept of materiality in securities
regulation might be expected to mean the same thing in different
66
contexts; if it does not, an explanation for the difference is required.
If variations cannot be convincingly explained, then either the rules
are not based on principles or they are based on the wrong
principles. 67 For example, Section 13(d), which requires 5% owners to
disclose their position and intent concerning control, should bear some
logical relation to the concept of materiality. Thus, the rule is coherent
if it requires disclosure of information that "reasonable investors
68
would consider important in making an investment decision."
Third, the interaction among rules and principles reduces
anxiety over whether an individual provision initially should be
formed as a rule or a principle. The issue is how much the form of
articulation controls its application and interaction with other
provisions so that outcomes vary in otherwise equivalent
circumstances. Perhaps there is some control, but with dynamic
interaction, convergence occurs to limit its effect. As a general
powers.
example, consider the separation of governmental
Legislatures may create laws residing toward either end of the rulesprinciples spectrum. However, when legislatures enact rules, judges
69
often transform the rules into laws exhibiting principle-like features.
Conversely, when legislatures enact principles, judges can tighten
them into laws with rule-like features. 70 This observation does not
mean that the initial legislative choice is inconsequential; it may be of

66. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448-49 (interpreting "materiality" in line with previous
decisions in different contexts).
67. See Christopher W. Nobes, Rules-Based Standards and the Lack of Principles in
Accounting, 19 ACCT. HORIZONS 25, 27-32 (2005) (identifying detailed, technical accounting rules
that are required due to the absence of underlying standards or inappropriate underlying
standards).
68. Brudney, supra note 64, at 734-35.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 123-24 (giving the example of statutory legal capital
rules that are mediated by judicial invocation of reasonable accounting and valuation principles).
70. See Schauer, supra note 51, at 321-28 (citing SEC Rule 10b-5 as an example of a
standard turned into a rule through judicial intervention); infra text accompanying notes 108-15
(example of the relationship between section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
authorizing director-liability exculpation and the judicial doctrine of good faith that amplifies an
exception to that authorization).
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considerable significance in given cases. However, it also suggests that
the choice is not final-the form does not control the application.
This observation also contributes perspective on any systemic
preference for expressing individual provisions as rules or principles.
The dynamic interaction of individual rules and principles within
larger systems suggests caution about designing a legal or accounting
system that presumptively privileges rules or principles. If any
presumption were warranted at an abstract level, it would suggest
having a combination of rules and principles to maximize the benefits
of the interaction between them. But even that presumption risks
overlooking important trade-offs associated with formulating
individual provisions and ignoring the dynamics of their application
and interaction within the larger system. In short, the binary labels of
rules-based and principles-based to describe complex regulatory
systems likely are too crude to be faithful to the realities they must
71
comprehend.
II. A SURVEY OF THE SYSTEMS
While the preceding discussion suggests conceptual difficulties
in imagining how any legal or accounting system can be either rulesbased or principles-based, the following discussion surveys actual and
proposed systems of corporate law, securities regulation, and
accounting. It attempts to provide, for each system, both an inventory
of individual provisions and a sense of how the provisions are applied
and how they interact. The examination justifies more skepticism that
any of these systems may be described fairly using such labels.
A. Existing Systems
A canvas of the major topics appearing on the syllabus in
corporations and securities regulation, and some of the commonly
cited topics in accounting, suggests that misconceptions exist about
how they may be classified as rules-based or principles-based. At a
minimum, common conceptions are overstated and should be
corrected.

71. Cf. Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. (forthcoming 2007) (recognizing the slipperiness of the two labels
and navigating an analysis of comparative systems by developing a thick account going well
beyond the form of provisions as rules versus principles to include such attributes as how law is
promulgated, by whom, with what frequency, and with what level of enforcement).
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1. Corporate Law
Scholars commonly describe corporate law, especially Delaware
corporate law, as principles-based, 72 although a few see a more rulelike quality to the principles.7 3 As the following discussion shows, both
are credible positions, meaning that neither is clearly correct.
Corporate law is a mixture of rules and principles whose application
and interaction generates a rich, complex tapestry that diminishes the
utility of any such tidy classifications.
Before deeply examining corporate law, note first that inquiry
concerning rules versus principles is distinct from the debate in
corporate law scholarship concerning whether the law is or should be
more mandatory or enabling.7 4 Corporate law doctrines range along a
rules-principles continuum, whether they are required by law or
optional. Cumulative voting resides at the rules end of the continuum
by providing a specific mathematical formula for casting and counting
votes in director elections, but generally is permissive. 75 The duty of
loyalty resides at the principles end of the continuum as vague and
72. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discriminationin the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1236 (2001) ("Delaware's corporate law tends to rely on
standard-based tests [meaning] that the relation between a certain set of facts and the outcome
of a legal dispute is determined ex post rather than ex ante."); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory
Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in CorporateLaw, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1914-15 (1998)
("Delaware [corporate] law is at one end of this continuum. It relies extensively on broad legal
standards."); Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in
Japan, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171, 2212 (2005) ("The major features of Delaware corporate law
[include] the prevalence of broad standards over detailed rules.").
73. Compare Troy A. Paredes, A Systems Approach to Corporate Governance Reform: Why
Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn't the Answer, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1133-34 (2004)
("Delaware law of fiduciary duties is itself more rule-like and predictable than many standards,
having been fleshed out by an extensive body of case law precedent that reflects a consistent
underlying norm of shareholder primacy."), with Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware
Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1071 (2000)
("Delaware's corporate law rules are standards based." (emphasis added)), and Edward B. Rock,
Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1014
(1997) (criticizing "a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware corporate law largely
involves standards, but then to try to reduce it to a set of rules").
74. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An Essay
on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1653-89 (1989) (distinguishing debate over
contractual freedom from inquiry into how judges should approach gaps in corporate
arrangements); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 984, 987-98 (1993) (surveying the arguments for and against mandatory rules for
corporations).
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2001) (stating that a certificate of incorporation may
provide for cumulative voting); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28 (2002) (providing that
"[s]hareholders do not have a right to cumulate their votes for directors unless the articles of
incorporation so provide"). In the minority of states that require cumulative voting, disputes
concerning its use may be resolved by applying principle-like tools such as fiduciary duty. See,
e.g., Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 782-89 (Ohio 1956) (reconciling the tension in a
jurisdiction which requires cumulative voting but also permits the classification of directors).
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hortatory, but generally is mandatory. Similarly, the policy approach
called "comply or explain," common in European practice, can refer to
provisions that are either principle-like or rule-like (such as "we have
independent directors" or "independence means x, y, and z,"
76
respectively).
Turning to the details, at the rules end of the corporate law
spectrum are provisions that establish a hierarchy of sources of legal
authority. This hierarchy puts state corporation law statutes at the
top, followed by articles of incorporation (the charter), then by-laws,
and then contracts (with judicial decisions hovering throughout). As
such, statutes may authorize corporations to adopt tailored provisions
suiting particular goals, but then require that any tailored provision
appear in the charter or in the by-laws. 77 Courts treat provisions
placed in the wrong document as dead letters. 78 When the charter and
by-laws contain conflicting provisions, a corporate law rule provides
79
that the charter controls.
Rules delineate the distribution of power in corporate life. The
basic rule relating to shareholder power is a simple negative
injunction: shareholders have no general power over management of a
corporation.8 0 Corporation statutes provide that boards have this
power. However, statutes grant shareholders power in specific
situations, usually director elections, charter amendments, certain

76. See, e.g., HAL S. SCOTT & GEORGE S. DALLAS, MANDATING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: CAN
ONE SET OF RULES FIT ALL? 25-30 (2006), available at http://www.ahcgroup.com/pdfs/
S&PDallas&ScottCorpBehavior.pdf (dwelling on the rhetoric of rules as "prescriptive and
legalistic" while inadvertently showing that any preference for the approach of "comply or
explain" has no bearing on the rules versus principles question).
77. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 7.27, 7.28, 8.24 (covering action by shareholders, the
election of directors, and action by directors respectively).
78. See Roach v. Bynum, 437 So. 2d 69, 70 (Ala. 1983) (deeming unenforceable supermajority shareholder quorum and voting provision required to appear in charter when they
instead appeared in by-laws); Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1034-36 (Del.
1985) (declaring unenforceable a director-approved by-law amendment limiting shareholder
action because it conflicted with Delaware Code section 228(b), which requires any limitations on
this grant of authority to appear in the charter).
79. E.g., Paulek v. Isgar, 551 P.2d 213, 215 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976) ("Where bylaws conflict
with the articles of incorporation, the articles of incorporation control and the bylaws in conflict
are void."); Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, Inc., 60 N.E.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. 1945) (striking down bylaws contrary to statutory requirements applicable to all corporations).
80. See tit. 8, § 141(a) ("The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors."); Manson v. Curtis,
119 N.E. 559, 561 (N.Y. 1918) (stating that even in the presence of voting agreements,
shareholders do not maintain proxy over corporate business and affairs); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 8.01 ("All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business
and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors.").
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business combinations, and dissolutions81 Yet even in specific cases
where shareholders have power, they usually lack authority to initiate
action, but only may consent to (or withhold consent from) board-made
82
proposals.
Rules require that shareholders elect directors.8 3 Rules
granting managerial power to boards of directors are accompanied by
additional rules regulating board conduct. Directors have no power to
act individually, but only to bind the corporation when acting together
as a board.8 4 Both statutory rules and judicial applications of them
impose stringent formalities for board action. For example, statutes
typically contain rules requiring notice and quorums.8 5 They also
authorize action both by written consent in lieu of meetings, but only
if unanimous, and by use of teleconference connections, but only if
86
specified requirements are met.
Why all these rules? They provide a baseline ordering
mechanism necessary to create the formal entity called the
corporation; they also begin to shape the balance of power among its
participants.8 7 Principles come into play to mediate these rules,
provide rationales, and interact with them to complicate the system's
overall character. Thus, while the hierarchy of corporate law sources
contributes apparent rule-like clarity, it is possible to persuade a court
to enforce, as a contract, a provision placed in a by-law when a statute
directs it to appear in the charter.8 8 Rules granting managerial power
to boards and episodic consenting power to shareholders are relaxed
considerably into a principle-like framework for closely held

81. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.03-.05, 10.03-.04, 11.03, 14.02-.03 (allocating power to
shareholder in the election of directors, amendment of articles of incorporation, statutory
mergers, and voluntary dissolution respectively).
82. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. LAW.
43, 43-46 (2003) (calling the supposed power of shareholders 'largely a myth").
83. See tit. 8, § 211(b) ("An annual meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of
directors.").
84. E.g., Gashwiler v. Willis, 33 Cal. 11, 18-19 (1867) (stating that an action taken by a
group of shareholder-directors in their individual capacities is not effective as a valid action of
the board of directors).
85. E.g., tit. 8, § 141(b) (2001 & Supp. 2006) (requiring quorum); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§
8.22, 8.24 (requiring notice and quorum respectively).
86. E.g., tit. 8, § 141(f), (i) (2001) (allowing action by unanimous written consent in lieu of a
meeting and teleconferencing respectively); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.21 (allowing action by
unanimous written consent in lieu of a meeting).
87. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1549, 1593 (1989) (noting power allocation function of such mandatory terms in corporate law).
88. See Jones v. Wallace, 628 P.2d 388, 391-93 (Or. 1981) (addressing the argument that
otherwise invalid by-laws in effect upon the signing of a shareholder agreement can be enforced
under a contract theory).
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corporations, a context in which many traditional rules of corporate
89
law similarly relax into principles.
Toward the rules end of the corporate law spectrum are
provisions governing the forms of business combinations and
divestitures. Corporate law offers a menu of alternative forms,
including statutory merger, asset sales, and stock sales. 90 This enables
transaction engineers to structure deals that, while having identical
substantive effects, may or may not require a shareholder vote or
carry appraisal rights.9 1 Courts respect formal statutory rules,
invoking the judicial doctrine of independent legal significance to
reinforce them (in effect, a rule that denies the principle embodied in
the judicially-developed de facto merger doctrine). 92 To protect against
hostile takeover bids, moreover, statutes offer rule-bound antitakeover provisions that courts likewise respect.9 3
Rules also enable designing transactions to achieve identical
substantive results using subsidiary corporations that likewise avoid
shareholder votes or appraisal rights. Courts similarly defer to these
structural maneuvers, projecting a rigid, rule-like quality to these
laws. 94 Courts respect statutory distinctions between redemptions and
mergers, even when transactional alternatives present identical

89. See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 405 N.E.2d 681, 684-88 (N.Y. 1980) (enforcing agreement
despite noncompliance with statutory provisions); Triggs v. Triggs, 385 N.E.2d 1254, 1254 (N.Y.
1978) ("That an agreement between corporate shareholders includes illegal provisions with
respect to the election of corporate officers and the fixation of their compensation does not
preclude enforcement of the provision for a stock purchase option contained in the same
agreement."); see also Larry E. Ribstein & Burce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network
Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 85, 89 (2001) (describing the difficulties presented by
corporate rules intended to affect closely-held corporations).
90. E.g., tit. 8, §§ 241, 251, 271 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (allowing for redemptions, mergers,
and asset sales respectively); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.03 (governing share
exchanges).
91. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123, 124-25 (Del. 1963) (rejecting
shareholders' claim that a sale of assets transaction having the same functional effect as a
merger required shareholder approval under statutory merger rules); Heilbrunn v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 150 A.2d 755, 757-59 (Del. 1959) (similarly rejecting the so-called de facto merger
doctrine).
92. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the
Interpretationof Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 831-40 (2004) (tracing
the origins and development of the doctrine of independent legal significance).
93. E.g., tit. 8, § 203 (providing specific rules which lay out ex ante instructions to avoid
hostile takeovers including extensive definitions of terms such as interested stockholder, and
bright-line thresholds, such as 90-day and 3-year periods, 66.66% voting approval requirements,
and 85% ownership stipulations).
94. See, e.g., Equity Group Holdings v. DMG, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1197, 1201-07 (S.D. Fla.
1983) (refusing to treat separate but related transactions having the functional effect of merger
as a de facto merger under Florida law).
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substantive consequences to shareholders. 95 The same rule-bound
results follow in relation to third parties. In transactions structured as
mergers, all assets and liabilities of the constituent corporations
combine "by operation of law" with immutable implications for thirdparty consents; 96 but in asset or stock acquisitions, assets and
liabilities transfer by operation of contract with changeable
97
implications for third-party consents.
Why these rules? As with the rules and principles establishing
and mediating the hierarchy of sources in corporate law, these rules
prescribe mechanical devices to govern a corporation's life; they also
allocate power among participants. How are they mediated? As to
respecting forms of corporate combinations, the de facto merger
doctrine sometimes prevails for shareholders and more often succeeds
when advanced by other constituencies to challenge formal
transaction structures. Thus, non-shareholder claimants increasingly
succeed in invoking the de facto merger doctrine when asserting
claims in tort, labor, and environmental law. 98 Even the rule-like
character of the doctrine of independent legal significance can be
whittled away when courts decide that two parts of a transaction are
integrally related rather than independent. 99
The statutory law of appraisal rights is intensely rule-bound,
especially in Delaware. There, appraisal provisions are a detailed
labyrinth of rules that first grant rights, then deny them, and then
finally restore some of them depending on stated formal attributes of a
transaction.100 Yet courts awarding the appraisal remedy face
numerous questions whose resolution requires applying vague
concepts. These involve such matters as whether the appraisal remedy
95. See, e.g., Rauch v. RCA Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-33 (2d Cir. 1988) (sharply distinguishing
between merger and redemption transactions in accordance with technical details of separate
statutory provisions despite substantively identical effects).
96. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d 1090, 1095-96 (6th Cir. 1979)
('The merger was effected by the parties and the transfer was a result of their act of merging.").
97. See Branmar Theatre Co. v. Branmar, Inc., 264 A.2d 526, 529 (Del. Ch. 1970) (holding
that a transfer of a lease agreement in connection with a sale of stock transaction was not an
"assignment" under the terms of the lease).
98. See, e.g., Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43-46 (1987)
(determining, in the context of labor law, whether one company was the "successor" of another);
North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 651-54 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying the de facto
merger doctrine in the context of environmental law); Ruiz v. Blentech Corp., 89 F.3d 320, 32425 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the de facto merger doctrine in the context of personal injury
liability).
99. See Louisiana Mun. Police Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1191-92
(Del. Ch. 2007) (treating special dividend and stock-for-stock merger as integral components of
single transaction rather than as separate transactions warranting independent legal
treatment).
100. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2001) (setting forth provisions governing
appraisal rights in Delaware).
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is exclusive or may be conjoined with other claims,1 0' the applicable
10 3
valuation method,'0 2 and identification of the business to be valued.
The resulting appraisal remedy doctrine can be described as rulesbased or principles-based, but in fact, it is a mixture-neither is a
particularly faithful description.
Toward the principles end of the continuum in corporate law
are the laws of fiduciary duty, mainly the duties of care and loyalty. It
is possible to understand much of Delaware corporate fiduciary duty
law as hortatory sermonizing. 0 4 Many characterize Delaware
fiduciary duty law as indeterminate, putting it squarely on the
principles end of any continuum.' 05 That location is unsurprising when
one considers that Delaware courts conceive of themselves as courts in
equity (a designation still formally retained by the state's Court of
Chancery). 10 6 Even when statutorily codified, as in the Model Business
Corporation Act ("the Model Act"), the duty of care bears a vague
07
general quality typically associated with principles.'

101. E.g., Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001) (stating that,
absent allegations of fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy for a minority
shareholder objecting to a short-form merger); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d
1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985) (holding that an appraisal proceeding is not the exclusive remedy
when minority shareholders allege nondisclosure or misrepresentation).
102. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983) (overruling previous case
law that limited monetary damages in a cash out merger to "a single remedial formula" and
allowing plaintiffs to seek a fairness valuation by any method "in conformity with the principle
applicable to an appraisal-that fair value be determined by taking 'into account all relevant
factors'" (quoting tit. 8, § 262(h))).
103. E.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (addressing whether
the business to be valued is solely the business as it existed absent the transaction or that
business taking account of value that arises in the first stage of a two-step acquisition).
104. Rock, supra note 73, at 1016 (referring to the product of Delaware courts as "corporate
law sermons").
105. See Sean J. Griffith, Good FaithBusiness Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence,55 DUKE L.J. 1, 53 n.221 (2005) (citing and summarizing more than a dozen
articles offering competing assessments of the virtues of such indeterminacy in Delaware
corporate fiduciary duty law).
106. See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law
after QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW.
1593, 1618 (1994) ("[Als judges in equity, [judges in Delaware courts] must also be concerned
that the rules they are applying lead to fair and consistent results."); Lyman P.Q. Johnson &
Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149,
1193-94 (2004) ("Courts have long recognized that corporate officers and directors are fiduciaries
and that equity, not law, is the source of their fiduciary obligations.").
107. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (2002) ("The members of the board of directors...
shall discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
believe appropriate under similar circumstances."); D. Gordon Smith, A Proposal to Eliminate
Director Standards from the Model Business CorporationAct, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201, 1209-27
(1999) (arguing that the MBCA's statutory statement of the duty of care may alter the common
law standards under which the standard has "thrived" to date).
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Still, fiduciary duty cases addressing designated doctrinal
subjects can be synthesized into recognizable rules.10 8 In mundane
cases of ordinary business decisions or activity, the "business
judgment rule" presumes that directors met their duty of care. The
few cases subjecting directors to liability for breaching the duty of care
in ordinary contexts address egregious behavior, as when directors are
inebriated or ill-informed, or commit illegal acts. 10 9 A rule thus
emerges that directors are liable for breach of the duty of care in
ordinary settings only in such narrow circumstances. Corporations
also can opt for a statute-authorized rule against personal director
financial liability for breaching the duty of care, 11 0 a license created
immediately after the Delaware Supreme Court held ill-informed
directors liable for breaching the duty."'
That license assumes the form of a rule: it concretely and
prospectively authorizes exculpation. However, the rule has a limit.
Exculpation does not extend to liability arising from "acts or omissions
not in good faith." 11 2 The vast majority of Delaware corporations took
advantage of the rule, which in turn contributed to increasing judicial
invocation of a principle of good faith.1 1 3 Resulting judicial opinions
are complex and so difficult to reconcile that they provide little
108. See Paredes, supra note 73 (discussing how corporate law "should, to the extent
possible, comprise bright-line rules, as opposed to more ambiguous open-ended standards"); see
also Rock, supra note 73, at 1104 (noting and criticizing the tendency of scholars to pursue this
route, as the more subtle approach of Delaware courts may prove preferable to bright-line rules
in influencing the behavior of outside directors).
109. E.g., Miller v. AT&T, 507 F.2d 759, 762-63 (3d Cir. 1974) (illegal campaign
contributions); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873-74 (Del. 1985) (ill-informed directors);
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 825-26 (N.J. 1981) (director prone to inebriation
and other ills failing to read financial statements); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d
959, 972 (Del. Ch. 1996) (approving settlement agreement and elaborating, in dicta, on the duty
of care's bearing on maintaining a system of internal control).
110. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (stating that a corporation's articles of
incorporation may set forth a provision "eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director
to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a
director").
111. See Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d at 873-74 (holding directors liable for a breach of the duty of
care when the court deemed their decision to accept a certain price per share in a merger
transaction uninformed); see also Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1060 (2006) (noting that the Van Gorkum case represents the only instance where
outside directors have made personal payments after a trial since 1980).
112. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7). The limitation also excludes liability arising from breaches of the
duty of loyalty, unlawful distributions, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, and
deriving improper personal benefits. Id.
113. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 4-6, 9-10 (2006) (describing the basis and history of the duty of good faith in light of attempts
to insulate directors from liability for breaches of fiduciary duties); Hillary Sale, Delaware's Good
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 466-82 (2004) (noting that director exculpation for due care
breaches does not insulate directors from breaches of good faith and tracing the development of
the duty of good faith through Delaware case law).
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advance direction. 11 4 The result is a vagueness that is characteristic of
principles. This development illustrates not only how rules and
principles interact, but also how a relatively tight statutory rule can
be judicially transformed into a much more open-ended principle. 115
The ultimate principle in corporate law is the duty of loyalty. 116
It forbids corporate officers and directors from acting contrary to the
interests of their beneficiaries, traditionally meaning the corporation
and its shareholders. When personal and corporate interests conflict,
the official must subordinate her interests to those of the corporation
and its shareholders. These abstract principles involving "selfinterested" transactions are mediated in many states by statutory
safe-harbor rules delineating processes that officials can follow to
protect their decisions from judicial rebuke--usually approval by a
majority of disinterested and fully informed directors or
1 17
shareholders.
Although written as rules, the linguistic character of such
statutes requires interpretation by judges in order to mediate between
the principle of loyalty and the rules of process that the statutes
articulate. Based on this interaction, cases produce results with
varying degrees of vagueness (blending attributes of rules and
principles). Thus, although the duty of loyalty is equity-like, it still
carries hints of rule-ness. This hybrid quality manifests itself in the
tests that Delaware courts use to evaluate breaches of the duty of
loyalty in contexts outside self-interested transactions, especially
respecting the entire fairness test in cash-out mergers and the
11 8
heightened scrutiny applied in takeover contexts.
114. See Matthew R. Berry, Does Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless Directors
From PersonalLiability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1125,
1127 (2004) ("[T]he courts have not provided clear guidance as to whether section 102(b)(7)
protects directors from personal liability arising from their reckless conduct."); John L. Reed &
Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith"and the Ability of Directors to Assert §102(b)(7) of the Delaware
General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and
Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 140 (2004) (concluding that the

Delaware Supreme Court must "clarify the standard or threshold required for allegations of
abdication or lack of oversight to ... implicate the duty of good faith"); David Rosenberg, Making
Sense of Good Faith in Delaware CorporateFiduciaryLaw: A ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J.

CORP. L. 491, 492 (2004) ("Delaware courts ... currently offer no coherent framework for
understanding the most fundamental duties imposed on corporate directors."). For the Delaware
Supreme Court's attempt at clarification, see Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 66-71.
116. E.g., Schnell v. Christ-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) ("[flnequitable
action does not become permissible simply because it is legally possible.").
117. E.g., tit. 8, § 144 (providing insulation from judicial review of self-interested
transactions that are approved by a majority of disinterested directors or shareholders); MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-.63 (similar provision).
118. See Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover

Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 592-605 (1994) (offering coherent account of Delaware
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In cash-out mergers, judges endorse using an independent
committee to mimic an arm's length transaction measured by fair
value. 11 9 In takeovers, courts define vague fiduciary duty to require
boards to auction a company to the highest bidder if a sale is to be
effected; 120 if a transaction does not amount to a sale, then associated
defensive tactics must survive a reasonableness test. 121 In both
contexts, courts review whether directors were independent and
followed a sufficient process to benefit shareholders, blending rules
122
and principles.
If corporate law contains both rules and principles that are
applied and interact in ways that defy systemic classification, does it
matter whether an articulation originates as a rule or as a principle?
Two examples suggest that it matters little. First, laws governing
shareholder distributions can be stated either way. Traditional
statutes, such as those in Delaware, are detailed rules that apply
concepts of par value and legal capital.1 23 In contrast, modern
statutes, like the Model Act, use general principles, forbidding a
distribution when it would prevent the corporation from paying its
debts when due or reduce its assets below liabilities (measured using

takeover cases despite much criticism of them as incoherent); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm and the
Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 29 J. CORP. L. 103, 138-63 (2003) (offering
coherent account of the cases using the theory of the firm).
119. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (noting that among the
strategies boards might use to approve a cash-out merger are independent negotiating
committees); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in CorporateLaw, 43 DUKE L.J.
425, 434-36 (1993) (discussing process-oriented concept of fairness in corporate law).
120. E.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46 (Del. 1994)
(noting "directors' obligation to seek the best value reasonably available for the stockholders
where there is a pending sale of control"); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) ("[Iun the context of an auction for corporate control ... directors commit
themselves, inexorably, to obtaining the highest value reasonably available to the shareholders
under all circumstances."); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
184 (Del. 1986) (discussing directors' obligation, as part of their enhanced duties in a takeover
situation, "to bring the target's shareholders the best price available for their equity").
121. E.g., Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152-55 (Del. 1989)
(noting that the burden rests on the target's board of directors to show any defensive measures
were reasonable); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-57 (Del. 1985) ("If a
defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.").
122. Emphasis on the process-oriented rules produces concern that directors and advisors
use mindless checklists to meet the expected requirements. See Stephen J. Lubben & Alana J.
Darnell, Delaware's Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 589, 591 (2006) (noting "the waning of the
duty of care [to] a rule that now requires little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration
of relevant data"); infra Part III.A.
123. See, e.g., tit. 8, §§ 154, 160, 170, 171, 173, 244 (defining and using such technical and
arcane terms as capital, surplus, and par value in elaborate detail to regulate a corporation's
power to declare and pay dividends and make other distributions to its shareholders).
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any methods that are reasonable under the circumstances).1 24 Courts
apply the traditional statutes liberally, allowing boards to measure
statutory terms (such as assets and liabilities) according to reasonable
valuations they choose.1 25 Perhaps it matters whether one or the other
is the starting point, but this evidence suggests that it matters only
slightly. 126
Second, a similar lawmaking option characterizes corporate
law governing asset sales. Traditional statutes require shareholder
consent when a corporation's board proposes to sell "all or
substantially all" of the corporation's assets. 127 Innovative statutes
attempt greater refinement by requiring a shareholder vote only if the
transaction leaves the corporation "without a significant continuing
business activity." 128 Comparing the provisions, the traditional one is
relatively more principle-like, while the innovative one is slightly
more rule-like (a pure rule formulation would define the threshold
numerically, and no U.S. corporate law statute does so). Yet, the
alternative statutes lead to the same result.129
This survey spans much of the corporate law syllabus. A full
examination would confirm that rules and principles dot the landscape
in blended measure, with applications and interactions that influence
and reshape systemic characteristics. While rule-like provisions
address corporate formation, preemptive rights, director removal, and
shareholder oppression and deadlock, principle-like provisions
mediate each of these. Principle-like provisions also appear in the
corporate opportunity doctrine, where case law enables synthesized

124. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 6.21, 6.40 (2002) (using general tests of ability to
pay debts when due and having assets exceed liabilities as limits on a corporation's power to
declare and pay dividends and make other distributions to its shareholders).
125. See Kang v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 152-58 (Del. 1997)
(allowing the use of other reasonable measures to determine legality of shareholder distribution
despite technical terms in Delaware statute); Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 179-83 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1940) (construing traditional legal capital statute while recognizing potential
departures from general accounting principles as reasonable).
126. See BAYLESS MANNING & JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 194-97 (3d ed. 1990)
(noting the evolution from old fashioned legal capital rules, which endure in Delaware statutory
law, to a liberalized approach contained in modern statutes); Craig A. Peterson & Norman W.
Hawker, Does Corporate Law Matter? Legal Capital Restrictions on Stock Distributions, 31
AKRON L. REV. 175, 178 (1997) (concluding, after empirical study, that the forms may matter
some for purposes of signaling information to shareholders in the market, even if they do not
matter much in respect of creditor protection).
127. E.g., tit. 8, § 271(a).
128. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 12.02(a).
129. See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int'l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 386 n.79 (Del. Ch. 2004)
(emphasizing comparability of Delaware's section 271 with the Model Act's section 12.02(a)
despite literal linguistic differences).
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statements bearing a rule-like character. 13 0 Limited liability is a rule
subject to exceptions based on public-regarding principles. Corporate
dispute administration is replete with yet another set of principles
and rules, addressing matters such as indemnification, special
litigation committees, and statutes of limitation.13 1 In sum, these
illustrations suffice to question the possibility of tidy classification of
corporate law as rules-based or principles-based, in Delaware or in
other states.
2. Securities Regulation
Many scholars and judges nevertheless promote Delaware
corporate law as principles-based, especially when contrasting it with
U.S. federal securities regulation, which they allege to be rulesbased.1 32 Others believe that federal securities regulations' alleged
rule-density serves the purpose of offsetting the deficiencies of state
corporate law's alleged penchant for principles.1 33 U.S. securities
regulation also often is decried as being rules-based in contrast to
other nations' securities regulations, especially Canada's, which are
described as principles-based.13 4 The following survey of U.S.
securities regulation supports none of these characterizations.

130. See Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the
Corporate OpportunitiesDoctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 279, 279 (1998) (succinctly stating the doctrine
in a simple algorithm bearing a rule-like quality and expressing regret that "this doctrinal
algorithm has proven unwieldy in application"). See generally Ne. Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v.
Harris, 725 A.2d 1018, 1021-23 (Me. 1999) (drawing on synthesis of the corporate opportunity
doctrine as codified by the American Law Institute as a way to provide clarity to this murky
area); Harvey Gelb, The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine: Recent Cases and the Elusive Goal of
Clarity, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 371 (surveying various state tests in corporate opportunity doctrine,
including factors of corporate capacity and information disclosure, showing both broad principles
and specific rules at work).
131. Matthew G. Dore, Statutes of Limitation and CorporateFiduciary Claims:A Search for
Middle Ground on the Rules/Standards Continuum, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 695, 720-36 (1997).
132. E.g., Griffith & Steele, supra note 9, at 20-23 (contrasting Delaware corporate law's
"supple," "flexible," "subtle," and "responsive" corporate law to federal securities regulation,
which involves issuing mandates, governance directives, and orders); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance to Corporate
Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 512-13 (2000) (stating that flexible corporate law is more effective
than "comparatively rigid, rules-based systems.., such as the securities laws"); Kamar, supra
note 72, at 1921 ("It is instructive ... to compare Delaware law with federal securities law,
which ...

[is] rule-based.").

133. E.g., Mark J. Roe, Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West 1, 5-7
manuscript, on file with author), available at
(Dec.
17, 2002) (unpublished
http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Roe-AER2003.doc (explaining that deficiencies of the
state corporate law system drove the creation of the federal securities regulatory system).
134. See, e.g., Kuras, supra note 6 (comparing Canadian securities regulation with U.S.
securities regulation); Robert Wright, Enron: The Ambitious and the Greedy, 16 WINDSOR REV.
LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 71, 73 (2003) (same).
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At the rules-end of the securities regulation continuum are the
vast majority of laws governing securities offerings. Entities,
transactions,
and securities must be registered; prescribed
prospectuses must be prepared and circulated. As with much of the
structure of U.S. federal securities regulation across all contexts, such
provisions are subject to exemptions, which are subject to further
exemptions and sometimes protected by safe harbors. Section 5 of the
Securities Act of 1933 requires registration unless an exemption
exists. 135 Sections 3 and 4 of the 1933 Act also provide exemptions.
SEC regulations provide safe harbors, all of which contain precisely
delineated boundaries 1 36-although some also use vague provisions,
such as a condition of good faith, 137 or depend on open-textured
concepts, such as whether an offering is "public" or "private." 138
Toward the rules-end of the securities regulation continuum
are many laws governing securities firms. While mostly rule-like, they
are tinged with an overlaying texture best described as principle-like.
Examples of broker-dealer rules are: net capital rules, 139 credit
135. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2000) (making it unlawful to
use interstate commerce to sell a security unless a registration statement is effective); id. §
77e(a)(2) (forbidding using interstate commerce to carry an unregistered security for purposes of
selling or delivering it); id. § 77e(c) (prohibiting offering to buy or sell a security before a
registration statement has been filed for it). Similarly, the Securities Exchange Act exempts
government and municipal securities and numerous others. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §
3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(12) (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (defining "exempted security" for
purposes of otherwise required registration under § 781(b)).
136. Exempted classes of securities under the Securities Act include self-employed benefit
plans, commercial paper, charitable and other nonprofit issuers, insurance, compensatory benefit
plans, and small issues. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(2)-(4), (8), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2)-(4), (8) (2000
& Supp. IV 2004); Securities Act Reg. A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2007); Securities Act Reg. D, 17
C.F.R. § 230.501 (2007); Securities Act Reg. E, 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2007). Exempted
transactions include exchanges with existing shareholders, intrastate issues, private offerings
and transactions by dealers, and brokers. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c(a)(9), 77c(a)(11), 77d(1)-(4) (2000);
Securities Act Rule 144, 17 C..F.R. § 230.144 (2007); Securities Act Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. §
230.144A (2007). As to safe harbors, see, for example, Securities Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j,
which allows tombstone advertisements; Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426
F.2d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1970) (en banc), which emphasizes the rule-like character of the safe
harbor, referring to it as based on a "checklist" of features that provides guidance superior to any
"judicially formulated 'rule of reason' "; Securities Act Rule 135, 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2007),
which addresses 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) liability.
137. Application of Securities Act § 3(a)(9), Securities Act Release No. 646, 11 Fed. Reg.
10,956, 10,956 (Feb. 3, 1936) (limiting eligibility for § 77c(a)(9)'s exemption for exchanges with
existing shareholders to an exchange made in good faith and not one intended simply to evade
the statute's requirements).
138. See, e.g., Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 4552, 27 Fed. Reg.
11,316, 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962) (explaining that the factors applied to determine whether the
private offering exemption is available include the identity, number, and sophistication of the
offerees, and size and manner of the offer); Exemption from Securities Act § 4(1), Securities Act
Release No. 285, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,952 (Jan. 24, 1935) (listing similar factors).
139. E.g., Exchange Act Rule 15c3-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (2007) (specifying methods of
computing net capital).
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extension rules, 140 short-sale rules, 14 1 trading practices rules, 142
customer confirmation rules, 143 and rules governing contingency
offerings. 144 These rules are supplemented by broad anti-fraud
principles of general applicability 45 and tailored to the broker-dealer
context by prohibitions on misappropriating customer funds or
securities, unsuitable or unauthorized trading, churning, and charging
146
excessive markups.
Why these rules (as supplemented by principles)? As with
corporate laws governing the hierarchy of sources of legal authority
and addressing business combinations and divestitures, securities
regulations stating filing requirements and firm conduct provide a
baseline. They establish requirements that are fundamental to the
existence of a regulated securities industry and disclosure system.
True, these laws are not inevitable-the free market could be left to
its own devices-but once a decision to regulate is made, it is not
surprising that the attributes of the regulatory system at this basic
level would be rule-like.
Nor is it surprising that such rules are mediated by associated
principles. In fact, all broker-dealer regulations ultimately derive from
principles that predate U.S. federal securities acts as epitomized by
the traditional "shingle theory" of securities professionals.' 47 For
example, the duty to obtain best execution for customer transactions is
rooted in common law agency principles. 148 Other general principles
that flow from these traditional concepts include the imposition of

140. E.g., Federal Reserve System Reg. T, 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.132 (2007).
141. E.g., Exchange Act Rule 10a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1 (2007).
142. E.g., Exchange Act Reg. M, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.100-.105 (2007).
143. E.g., Exchange Act Rule 10b-10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-10 (2007).
144. E.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-9, 240.15c2-4 (2007) (regulating the transmission or
maintenance of payments received in connection with underwritings).
145. See Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2000) (prohibiting fraud in
connection with the offer or sale of a security); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2000) (authorizing promulgation of anti-fraud regulations to prohibit use of
manipulative or deceptive devices); Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007)
(prohibiting the employment of manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security).
146. Exchange Act Rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (2007); Exchange Act Rule 15c2-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-1.
147. Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961) (Clark, J., concurring); see also Roberta
Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1271, 1271 (1995) (explaining the
concept as constituting an implied representation of fair dealing based upon holding oneself out
to the public as a broker or dealer).
148. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 173-74 (3d Cir.
2001) (en banc); Order Execution Obligations, Exchange Act Release No. 37,619A, 61 Fed. Reg.
48,290, 48,322 (Aug. 29, 1996).
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duties on firms to supervise employees.1 49 Additional examples of
principles include those that the SEC has invoked to contest the
inappropriate influence by investment bankers over research
analysts 150 and the allocation of IPO shares to favored customers in
1 51
exchange for inflated commissions or markdowns.
Disclosure laws include both rules and principles. Most
striking are provisions that require specific items to be disclosed and
include open-ended requirements to disclose other information
necessary to prevent these required statements from being misleading
in light of the circumstances under which they are made.1 5 2 Laws
governing the timing of filing disclosure documents are rule-like
(including Section 13(d)'s requirement of disclosure at the 5%
ownership level). 153 General laws qualified by concepts of materiality
are thoroughly and consciously principle-like. 5 4 The SEC's
requirement that disclosure be written in "plain English" is a
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E); see also
Prudential Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,149, 80 SEC Docket 1785, 1785-87 (July
10, 2003) (finding, on the basis of Prudential Securities, Inc.'s settlement offer, that Prudential
Securities, Inc. violated § 78o(b)(4)(E) by failing to supervise an employee who committed fraud
in connection with the sale of securities); Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 22,755, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,948, at 87,930,
87,945-48 (Jan. 2, 1986) (censuring Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. for failure to supervise
branch office managers). See generally Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Broker-Dealer
Supervision: A Troublesome Area, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 527 (1994) (discussing the recent focus
on supervision and the lack of clarity in the regulatory duties that complicate the issue); John H.
Walsh, Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive Compliance in the Securities
Industry, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 169-206 (discussing the regulatory developments that
encourage supervision).
150. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC, NY Att'y Gen., NASD, NASAA,
NYSE, and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Inv. Practices, (Dec. 20,
2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm (announcing a "global settlement" among
brokerage firms, state regulators, securities exchanges, and prosecutors in which brokerage
firms now must "insulat[e] research analysts from investment banking pressure").
151. See Parnes, Litigation Release No. 16,877, 74 SEC Docket 708 (Jan. 31, 2001)
(proceedings concerning Datek Securities).
152. E.g., SEC Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2007); Securities Act Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. § 230.408
(2007); Exchange Act Reg. 12B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2007).
153. See supra text accompanying note 65 (discussing Section 13(d)'s requirements).
154. Congress, the SEC and courts have emphatically eschewed providing any bright-line
content to the concept of materiality. See, e.g., Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988)
(rejecting agreement-in-principle test to trigger materiality of preliminary merger negotiations
and stating that while "[a] bright-line rule indeed is easier to follow than a standard that
ease of application
requires the exercise of judgment in the light of all the circumstances ....
alone is not an excuse for ignoring the purposes of the securities acts and Congress' policy
decisions"); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange
Act Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 73 SEC Docket 3, 10 (Aug.
15, 2000) ("[W]e do not believe an appropriate answer to [the difficulty of defining materiality] is
to set forth a bright-line test, or an exclusive list of 'material' items."); SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 99, Release No. SAB 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 12, 1999) (rejecting
efforts to design rules of thumb for accounting, such as a threshold measure of 5% of earnings).
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principle, although it also contains specific rule-like components such
as a prohibition against using "multiple negatives." 155 Disclosure
concerning financial matters may bear attributes of rules or principles
according to the qualities of the related accounting provisions. The
SEC offers a typology and illustrates the categories by characterizing
156
certain accounting provisions as rules and others as principles.
Toward the principles-end of the securities regulation
spectrum, U.S. insider trading laws prohibit trading while in
possession of material non-public information when occupying some
capacity of trust or other special relationship. 157 As applied to
corporate officers and directors, these laws derive from state fiduciary
duty principles and become a federal violation when coupled with the
anti-fraud provisions of federal securities statutes, which express
broad principles. 158 The SEC accelerated the development of these
laws in the mid-1980s when it began a vigorous campaign using the
enforcement model described as ad hoc-meaning weighted towards
enforcing broad, vague principles rather than specific, non-vague
rules. 159
Despite the genesis of insider trading laws as principles,
resulting applications can yield expressions bearing rule-like
attributes. At least in terms of their specificity and particularity, these
expressions famously occur when attempting to state the law
governing tipper-tipee liability, where vagueness dissolves into a

155. Securities Act Reg. C, 17 C.F.R. § 230.421(c), (d)(2) (requiring all prospectus information
to be written in clearly understandable prose and prohibiting multiple negatives, respectively).
156. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO
SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm [hereinafter SEC, SOX 108 STUDY].

The SEC's typology is discussed in detail in the next Section.
157. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997).
158. Four classes of persons are exposed to insider trading restrictions and hence liability:
classical insiders (based on corporate positions), temporary insiders (often professionals
providing services to the corporation), tippers and tipees in the flow of information that includes
such insiders, and misappropriators who essentially steal inside information. Ultimately, all
these persons are restricted and liable based upon some ultimate connection to a breach of
fiduciary duty. See, e.g., id. (misappropriation); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-60 (1983)
(tipping); SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1095 (2d Cir. 1987) (temporary insider); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (classical insider).
159. Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look Ahead
At the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. REG. 149, 156-57 (1990). The foundations of this enforcement
program were rooted in principles established two decades earlier. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 910-16 (1961) (describing anti-fraud rules-Securities Act section 17(a), Exchange
Act section 10(b), and Exchange Act Rule 10b-5--as "broad remedial provisions aimed at
reaching misleading or deceptive activities").
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dense rule-patterned framework. 16 0 Based on the extent of advance
notice provided, the SEC offers rule-like certainty concerning nonbusiness relationships that create liability risk 6 1 and insiders who
trade for reasons not based on their inside information.162
Some laws with principle-like qualities morph into multi-factor
tests. Consider the law forbidding market manipulation.' 63 All U.S.
market manipulation laws stem, in turn, from Section 10(b)'s principle
' 164
proscribing "manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances."
Establishing a market manipulation violation requires proving: (1) a
misrepresentation or omission of material facts or other fraudulent
device; (2) made in connection with the sale or purchase of securities;
and (3) made with scienter.165 This proof requires assessing multiple
166
factors concerning the nature, timing, and context of the trades.

160. See Douglas M. Branson, Choosing the AppropriateDefault Rule: Insider Trading Under
State Law, 45 ALA. L. REV. 753, 759-60 (1994) (dissecting the "complex" law of tippee liability
stated in Dirks); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation
Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation: From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB.
L. REV. 775, 778-81 (1988) (criticizing the misappropriation theory developed by common law as
a problematic blending of a "conduct" approach with an "effect" approach).
161. Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2007) (stating three non-exclusive
circumstances in which a person receiving confidential information owes a duty of trust or
confidence that would trigger application of the misappropriation theory); see also SEC v. Yun,
327 F.3d 1263, 1273 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (discussing background and scope of the SEC's rule).
162. Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1(c), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (stating that insiders may trade
on inside information when it is clear that the information is not a factor in their decision to
trade, as under a pre-existing plan, contract, or good faith instruction). See Alan D. Jagolinzer,
Do Insiders Trade Strategically within the SEC Rule 10b5-1 Safe Harbor? (Aug. 29, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), for a discussion that provides evidence suggesting
that insiders exploit the rule-like characteristics of this provision.
163. Section 9 of the Exchange Act prohibits "manipulation of security prices." Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2000) (making it unlawful for any person to
effect transactions "creating actual or apparent trading activity ... or raising or depressing [its]
price . . . for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others"). For
another example of a factor test, see supra note 138 (distinguishing between public offerings and
private placements of securities).
164. Section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
165. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) ("[Manipulation] refers
generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.").
166. Factors include activity-related features such as placing trades near the end of the day
to exert price pressure and trading activity based on non-economic factors, and context-related
features such as the trader's ownership concentration in the security and relative trading volume
in it. Patten, Release No. ID-303, 86 SEC Docket 2336, 2339 (Dec. 12, 2005); see also Finance
Investments, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 51,530, 85 SEC Docket 533, 534 (Apr. 12, 2005)
(focusing on trading activity based on non-economic factors in finding market manipulation and
also finding failure to supervise). Apparent motivations are relevant, like efforts that maintain a
market price exceeding the minimum required for continued listing (such as $1.00 on the
NASDAQ Stock Market). Patten, Release No. ID-303, 86 SEC Docket 2336, 2350 (Dec. 12, 2005).
Evidence of market manipulation tends to be inferred from detailed facts, such as evidence of
motive, placing orders for large numbers of shares and later canceling all or part of the order
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At the ultimate principles-end of the continuum are securities
laws containing anti-fraud and anti-abuse provisions. The anti-fraud
provisions encompass not only insider trading and market
manipulation, but nearly every provision in federal securities
regulation. 167 As noted, various regulations authorize exemptions from
registration for certain transactions, so long as certain rule-like
attributes exist. But these regulations also provide that stated
exemptions are unavailable if a transaction, or a series of them,
technically complies with the rules but otherwise is a scheme to evade
the registration provisions. 168 For example, one anti-abuse principle
broadly covers securities held in a form "used primarily to circumvent"
the reporting provisions of the 1934 Act.1 69 Broker-dealer regulations
include principles that expose professionals to liability for violation of
the anti-fraud provisions of Section 10(b) even if they comply to the
letter with the disclosure requirements imposed under the customer
170
confirmation rules.
In light of the numerous rules and rule-like provisions in U.S.
securities regulation, it would be difficult to contend that such antifraud and anti-abuse provisions render the law principles-based
rather than rules-based. But their presence, along with principle-like
provisions of materiality, similarly makes it difficult to contend that
the system is rules-based. 171 The individual provisions fall along a
continuum and are applied and interact in ways that transform the
system's overall complexion into one defying classification using the
binary labels of rules-based or principles-based.
The foregoing discussion spans much of the securities
regulation syllabus. Additional securities regulations likewise combine
before it cleared, and matching of purchases by one participant in a scheme with sales by
another.
167. The U.S. federal securities laws contain numerous anti-fraud provisions, including
Exchange Act section 10(b), Securities Act section 17(a), Exchange Act Regulation 14A governing
proxy solicitations, and Exchange Act section 14(e) and Regulation 14E governing tender offers.
See 2005 SEC PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REP. 8 (explaining that the overall enforcement
program must reach across all areas to achieve "[e]ffective deterrence of securities fraud'
(emphasis added)).
168. E.g., Securities Act Rule 144A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A prelim. note 3 (2007) (qualifying
the exemption for offers and sales to qualified institutional buyers); Securities Act Rule 147, 17
C.F.R. § 230.147 prelim. note 3 (qualifying the exemption for single-state transactions);
Securities Act Reg. D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 prelim. note 6 (2007) (qualifying the exemption for
offers and sales made under Regulation D); Securities Act Reg. S, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 prelim.
note 2 (2007) (qualifying the exemption for off-shore transactions).
169. Exchange Act Rule 12g5-1(b)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1(b)(3) (2007).
170. Ettinger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 835 F.2d 1031, 1036 (3d Cir.
1987).
171. Provisions concerning liability and defenses often hinge on principles too, such as
scienter, knowledge, reasonable belief or investigation, privity, loss causation, and transaction
causation.
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rules and principles to address many other circumstances. While too
vast to canvas fully, 172 one observes such a blend of provisions in
contexts such as proxy solicitations 173 and tender offers, which also
contain additional examples of factor tests. 174 Even the SarbanesOxley Act, which many say is "rules-based,"175 can be read to exhibit
an underlying basis in principles, making it plausibly "principlesbased."1 76 Notable critics of the Act as "rules-based" are accounting
promulgators, 177
whom the Act implicitly blamed for making U.S. GAAP
"rules-based."
As the next section shows, the Act's implicit charge
that GAAP is rules-based also is of dubious validity.
3. Accounting
Rhetoric holds that international financial reporting standards
("IFRS") are principles-based and U.S. GAAP is rules-based. 178 As
with frequent descriptions of Delaware corporate law and common
descriptions
of U.S.
federal
securities
regulation,
these
172. This discussion has not mentioned the Trust Indenture Act, the Investment Company
Act, the Investment Advisers Act, or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. But a study of these laws and
related regulations reveals a mixture of rules and principles that likewise defy tidy classification
of the overall systems as rules-based or principles-based.
173. Proxy solicitation provisions, contained in Regulation 14A, involve (a) principles-like
matters such as the definition of solicitation, exemptions, and safe harbors, (b) specific rule-like
disclosure requirements for proxy statements, filing requirements, and forms of proxy, (c)
shareholder proposal provisions and grounds for exclusion which blend a mixture of rules and
principles, and (d) elaborate provisions encompassing the entire context in which proxy
solicitations proceed, addressing the special roles of bankers, brokers, and dealers. Exchange Act
Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to .14b-2 (2007).
174. See Wellman v. Dixon, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating the test).
Compare Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1985) (reciting but
rejecting the test), with SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 950-52 (9th Cir.
1985) (applying the test). As with proxy solicitations, tender offer regulations encompass a full
range of provisions spanning the spectrum from such principles to detailed rules concerning
matters of filing, dissemination, disclosure, timing, and other communications and activities
occurring during the tender offer period.
175. E.g., Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, Corporate Governance and the SarbanesOxley Act: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1195
(2004) (characterizing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as "adopt[ing] a wholly novel, rules-based
approach to corporate governance"); Wright, supra note 134 (denigrating the "rules-based"
approach of Sarbanes-Oxley).
176. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Sarbanes-Oxley, Jurisprudence,Game Theory, Insurance and
Kant: Toward a Moral Theory of Good Governance, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1083, 1085, 1090-95 (2004)
(explaining how common law at times provided an underlying basis in principles for SarbanesOxley).
177. Katherine Schipper, Principles-BasedAccounting Standards, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 61, 71
(2003) (asserting that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains "detailed and prescriptive corporate
governance, at the federal level," being "markedly different from the principles-based approach
that has historically been taken at the state level" and warning that this atmosphere will, in
turn, stoke demand for more rules in accounting).
178. See supra note 7 (citing sources).
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characterizations are overstated. True, for given accounting topics,
U.S. GAAP employs bright-line rules (often numerical thresholds)
where IFRS states a principle (using relatively vague concepts such as
substantial or control). But both regimes ultimately show a
combination of these attributes, preventing a conclusion that one is
principles-based or rules-based in any meaningful sense.
Leases are a common example for which U.S. GAAP favors
rules and IFRS favors principles. 179 In both systems, leases are
divided into two classes (operating and capital/finance) and receive
different treatment accordingly: costs and receipts under operating
leases are recognized when incurred, while those under capital/finance
leases are allocated over multiple periods (i.e., capitalized). IFRS
leases are capitalized when an arrangement transfers substantiallyall
the risks and rewards of ownership; U.S. GAAP leases are capitalized
when one of four specific criteria exist, including a lease term that is
75% or more of the item's useful life or the present value of lease
80
payments is 90% or more of its fair value.
Although one may quarrel over the relative appeal of these
approaches, it is a stretch to infer from this example--or even an
assortment of kindred examples-that U.S. GAAP is rules-based or
IFRS is principles-based, for numerous contrary examples could be
given. Consider a paired example arising in the context of debates on
two different but related accounting topics: callable debt and
refinancing of debt. Both pose a question of classification as short-term
or long-term debt, with considerable consequences for important
financial ratios and an enterprise's financial condition and appearance.
Long-term debt that is callable may better be seen as short-term debt;
short-term debt to be refinanced on a long-term basis may better be
seen as long-term debt. How should the classification be made?
Short-term debt to be refinanced as long-term debt is so
reclassified if the enterprise intends to complete a refinancing,
evidenced by an agreement with specified characteristics. 181 When this
provision was adopted, a dissenter complained that its "intention" test

179. Rebecca Toppe Shortridge & Mark Myring, Defining Principles-Based Accounting
Standards,CPA J., Aug. 2004, at 34.
180. Compare BARRY J. EPSTEIN & ABBAS ALI MIRZA, WILEY lAS 2004: INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 559

(discussing classification under IAS No. 17) with ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 13,
7(c)-(d) (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1976).
181. CLASSIFICATION

OF

SHORT-TERM

OBLIGATIONS

EXPECTED

TO

BE

REFINANCED,

Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 6,
11 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975). The
characteristics are essentially an expiration date beyond one year, limited lender cancellation
rights, no covenants that are being breached, and the lender having capacity to consummate the
financing. Id.
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was too open-ended.1 8 2 In contrast, callable debt is to be classified as
short-term debt if due on demand within one year, or if the creditor
has the right to accelerate the debt because of debtor breach of the
agreement-that is, unless the lender has waived its acceleration
right.183 When adopted, dissenters from this provision complained that
it was too restrictive. They said it was a "further step to supplant
judgment in financial reporting with arbitrary rules."18 4 These
provisions endure in U.S. GAAP, side-by-side. Generalizing systemic
bases from such individual examples is thus unlikely to produce
reliable characterizations.
U.S. GAAP on derivatives contains excruciating complexity
spanning hundreds of pages, with detailed treatment specified
depending on whether a transaction is a hedge or not and, if a hedge,
a cash flow hedge, foreign currency hedge, or another kind. 8 5 On the
other hand, U.S. GAAP is practically as dense as IFRS, which is
substantially a copy of the U.S. GAAP provisions plus an additional
351 pages of implementation guidance. 8 6 Even though both systems
exhibit this rule-like quality, the provisions also direct classifying a
financial instrument as a hedge based on managerial intention in
using the instrument.187 That kind of vague test could justify
describing accounting for derivative securities as principle-like. 8 8
A misunderstood accounting provision at the heart of the
Enron case may explain why so many people say that U.S. GAAP is
rules-based. The provision concerns the definition of a subsidiary for
purposes of preparing consolidated financial statements that include
such entities. U.S. GAAP defines this as ownership of at least a

182. Id. (dissenting opinion).
183. CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS THAT ARE CALLABLE BY THE CREDITOR, Statement of

Fin. Accounting Standards No. 78, 5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1983).
184. Id. at 6 (dissenting opinion).
185. See ACCOUNTING

FOR

CERTAIN INVESTMENTS

IN DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES,

Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 115 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993).
186. Compare PATRICK R. DELANEY ET AL., WILEY GAAP 2004: INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 161-204 (2004) (explaining U.S.

GAAP treatment of derivatives accounting), with EPSTEIN & MIRZA, supra note 180, at 159-201
(explaining IAS treatment of derivatives accounting). See also Nobes, supra note 67, at 13 ("The
IAS No. 39 file at the IASB records that the project director ... considered twelve FASB
Statements, nine FASB Technical Bulletins, seven APB Opinions, nineteen AICPA Statements
of Position, and 109 EITF consensuses.").
187. See

FINANCIAL

INSTRUMENTS:

RECOGNITION

AND

DEVELOPMENT,

Int'l Accounting

Standard No. 39,
9 (Int'l Accounting Standards Bd. 2006); ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN
INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 115,
7, 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993).
188. See Schipper, supra note 177, at 65-67, 71 (emphasizing that U.S. GAAP on derivatives
ultimately is based on a fundamental principle of managerial intent).
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majority of the voting shares of another entity. 18 9 IFRS defines
subsidiary for this purpose as control of the other entity. The concepts
get at the same point: ability to influence the other entity so that the
parent's financial report should reflect its investee's financial position
and risk. But "majority" is a rule (it is not vague) and "control" is a
principle (its use of factors in addition to arithmetic creates
vagueness).
The confusion about Enron related the well-known provision on
subsidiaries to an obscure provision concerning special purpose
entities ("SPEs"). To avoid consolidation of an SPE, one must satisfy
both the provisions of consolidation accounting, as well as arcane
provisions applied to SPEs that require at least 3% of the SPE's total
capital (equity plus debt) to be equity. The latter requirement reduces
associated risk to the owners by capping the ratio of debt-to-equity at
33:1. It does not change the basic consolidation provision (more than
50% of the equity must be held by third parties). Yet, many
commentators suggested that SPEs could be excluded so long as a
mere 3% of their total equity was held by third parties. 190 This is not
the case, as that would vitiate the basic consolidation provision. 91 It is
absurd to allege that such a rule is to blame for the Enron abuses; it is
also misleading to argue that it illustrates that U.S. GAAP is rulesbased.
Consider accounting for equity investments. Both U.S. GAAP
and IFRS distinguish accounting for investments in equity securities
by dividing them into categories based on the level of influence an
ownership position enables the holder to exert. In addition to
subsidiaries, as just discussed, both systems use a breakpoint of 20% to
distinguish small stakes from medium stakes, a proxy for the level of
189. A post-Enron revision expands the concept to require consolidation of so-called variable
interest entities despite the basic rule. CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, FASB
Interpretation No. 46 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003).
190. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 329, 337 (2003) ("Enron would create an SPE and 'buy' 97 percent of the equity in the entity
in exchange for giving the entity some illiquid asset of highly uncertain value that Enron wanted
to clear off its balance sheet. For SEC/GAAP purposes, this arrangement would permit Enron to
move the asset off its balance sheet and even show a profit on its sale, so long as 3 percent of the
equity in the SPE was owned by independent, outside investors.") (citing Victor Fleischer,
Enron's Dirty Tax Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 94 TAX NOTES 1045 (2002)).

191. See Are Current FinancialAccounting Standards ProtectingInvestors: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Financial
Accounting Standards Board) (explaining that when the equity level is that low, 100% of it must
be held by third parties); see also Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free
Zone on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447, 454-55 (2003) ("First, it could not be
controlled directly or indirectly by Enron. Second, an equity investor, also independent of Enron,
must put at risk at least three percent of the SPE's capital.").

20071

"PRINCIPLES-BASEDSYSTEMS"

1457

influence an owner has over the other entity. When adopted as U.S.
GAAP, several members of the standard setting board debated the
provision, one arguing that the 20% trigger was too arbitrary. 92 It is
true that many people treat the breakpoint as a bright-line rule and
design transactions to avoid triggering it.193 But it was never intended
to operate that way. While this may indeed be a rule, it appears in both
U.S. GAAP and IFRS.
A common example of principles in accounting, under both U.S.
GAAP and IFRS, concerns loss contingencies. Liabilities for contingent
events and circumstances must be recognized or disclosed, but
uncertainty makes it difficult to prescribe associated rules ex ante.
194
Thus, accounting relies on principles of probability and magnitude.
Even so, in application, participants seek to specify the meaning of
probability and magnitude by using descriptions such as "more likely
than not" or assigning numerical measures benchmarked using other
accounting concepts, such as materiality.
At the ultimate principles-end of the continuum in both U.S.
GAAP and IFRS are a series of broad general accounting precepts.
Both systems require a fair presentation and emphasize substance
over form. U.S. GAAP also is based on an overarching concept of
decision usefulness. 19 5 Both systems are imbued with conventions

192. See generally THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING

FOR INVESTMENTS IN COMMON

STOCK, Accounting Principles Bd. Opinion No. 18 (Accounting Principles Bd. 1971) (Messr.
Broeker assenting with qualification), reprinted in FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ORIGINAL

PRONOUNCEMENTS: As AMENDED: VOLUME III APB18 (2005/2006 ed. 2005) (opining that
investors in non-majority investments "should always be required to demonstrate an ability to
exercise significant influence over the operating and financial policies of an investee and that at
no level of voting control under 51% should such significant influence be presumed to exist").
Another disagreed "with the arbitrary criterion of 20% combined with a variable test of
'significant influence'.., because such an approach is not convincing in concept and will be very
difficult to apply in practice." Id. (Messrs. Catlett & Horngren assenting with qualification).
FASB Interpretation No. 35 clarifies:
If there is an indication that an investor owning 20 percent or more of an investee's
voting stock is unable to exercise significant influence over the investee's operating
and financial policies, all the facts and circumstances related to the investment shall
be evaluated to determine whether the presumption of ability to exercise significant
influence over the investee is overcome.
CRITERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENTS IN COMMON
STOCK, FASB Interpretation No. 35 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1981).
193. E.g., C. W. Mulford & E. Comiskey, Investment Decisions and the Equity Accounting
Standard, 61 ACCT. REV. 519 (1986) (performing empirical study and concluding that the 20%
trigger influences investment decisions).
194. ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5

(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1975).
195. See William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the
FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 26-37 (2007) (noting that the FASB
chose decision usefulness-or "external transparency"-as the primary goal of accounting
theory).
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bearing aspirational qualities, including prudence and conservatism.
All these may be denominated as principles. And the preceding
illustrations-rules, principles, and a mix-interact with these broad
principles: all are simultaneously subject to the principles and
influence their meaning.
The broad principles animating U.S. GAAP lead a minority to
claim that U.S. GAAP is "principles-based." 196 The principles are
stated in a conceptual framework called Statements of Financial
Accounting Concepts ("SFACs"). Promulgators use these as a guide
when adopting accounting provisions for specific subjects. While not
formally part of U.S. GAAP, the SFACs provide its foundation.197 The
most important of these principles are noted in the preceding
paragraph (to provide a fair presentation and substance over form);
they also include that financial statements should be both relevant
198
and reliable.
The case that U.S. GAAP is "principles-based" is just as
plausible as the more common claim that it is "rules-based." Neither is
clearly correct. For example, an SEC study classified U.S. GAAP's
20
elements as rules-based, 99 principles-based, 20 0 and principles-only '
(and left some unclassified, including contingencies). True, many U.S.
GAAP provisions exhibit a rule-like quality as compared to IFRSsuch as those concerning leases and subsidiaries. But there is likewise

196. E.g., Schipper, supra note 177, at 61-63; see also William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron,
Sarbanes-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023,
1043-44 (2003) (explaining how Enron misunderstood a "three percent rule of thumb test" for
third-party equity investment to be a rigid rule despite the SEC repeatedly insisting that the test
was a principle and not "to be taken as a one-size-fits-all test").
197. Schipper, supra note 177, at 62.
198. Id. at 62-63, 66. Professor Bratton identifies at least seven other core principles in U.S.
GAAP: (1) realizationprinciple (revenue is recognized only when the earnings process is essentially
complete); (2) matching principle (expenses are allocated to the period in which the related benefit
contributes to generating revenue); (3) conservatism principle (prudent reaction to uncertainty as
by using the least optimistic estimates); cost principle (assets are reported at historical cost, not at
higher market prices; (4) consistency principle (using the same accounting methods over time); (5)
materiality principle (information in financial statements should be meaningful to users and not
trivial); (6) objectivity principle (information in financial statements should be verifiable); and (7)
disclosure principle (full and fair disclosure should be made in financial statements). Bratton,
supra note 196, at 1048.
199. SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note 156 (noting provisions addressing real estate sales,
receivables transfers, investments, derivatives, leases, pensions, retiree benefits, stock options,
and income taxes).
200. Id. (noting provisions addressing foreign currency translation, interest capitalization,
intangible assets, asset retirement obligations, long-lived asset impairment, inventory, business
combinations, and restructurings).
201. Id. (giving only one example of "principles-only" provisions, historical cost of depreciable
assets).
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a mix in IFRS, which also contains many rules, such as those
202
pertaining to derivative securities.
A further consideration in assessing the character of any
accounting system concerns the scope of discretion reposed in targeted
actors. Both U.S. GAAP and IFRS offer numerous alternative
approaches to accounting for a single transaction in many contexts.
Choices exist in mundane settings such as inventory and depreciation
and in more advanced subjects such as employee benefit plans and
amortization of debt. While it is difficult to measure which system
offers more choices, it is well-known that the political process of
approving IFRS entails contending viewpoints and a supermajority
approval requirement that has led IFRS in many contexts to offer
menus rather than definite prescriptions. 20 3 This feature may tempt
one to characterize it as principles-based. Yet, U.S. GAAP also offers
extensive menus, although this may be due to substantive rather than
political factors.
These examples suggest that it is difficult to say that an
accounting system is principles-based or rules-based. What users may
mean by these crude labels is a proxy for the relative density of each
or of a perceived or actual promulgator preference for providing rules
instead of principles when choices must be made. If it were true as an
empirical matter that U.S. GAAP is more rules-based than IFRS,
however, one reason may be simply the ordinary accretion that
accompanies age. U.S. GAAP has been formally promulgated for
almost a century; IASB is a fraction of that age. Accretion influences
the content-and perception-of the bodies of knowledge along the
rules-principles continuum. 20 4 Another reason for GAAP's rule density
is that, in response to demand, U.S. GAAP provides extensive
implementation guidance, along with frequent exceptions and other
5
limitations.20
Consider finally
the
SEC's enforcement
actions
in
accounting. 20 6 Areas most susceptible to misconduct-measured by the
202. See Nobes, supra note 67, at 29 (searching for an underlying principle in IAS No. 39).
203. Cf. GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING 361-62 (1998) (recognizing a need

for harmonizing accounting standards among nations while noting the obstacles presented by
cultural and political differences).
204. See Nelson, supra note 14, at 92 ("IAS appear more principle-based [than U.S. GAAP in
part because] they have not had as much time to accrete rules.").
205. Schipper, supra note 177, at 67 ("The only way to provide for treatment and scope
exceptions is by means of rules ....
[S]ome of the detail and complexity in U.S. GAAP stems
directly from requests for clarification or expansion of scope and treatment exceptions.").
206. See generally SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 704 OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002
(2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studiesl
sox704report.pdf [hereinafter SEC, SOX 704 REPORT] (studying SEC enforcement actions from
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SEC's enforcement action distribution-include the most principle-like
provisions in accounting: revenue recognition 207 and expense
recognition, 20 8 along with a sizable number of cases in the likewise
principle-rich contexts of asset impairment, inventory, business
combinations, and restructurings. 20 9 These data cast further doubt on
the characterization of U.S. GAAP as rules-based.
To summarize, accounting systems, like corporate law and
securities regulation, defy tidy classification as rules-based or
principles-based. This review of selected legal and accounting systems
supports the conclusion that it is at least imprecise to denominate any
of the described systems as principles-based or rules-based. This does
not prove that it is impossible to conceive of or design any system of
law or accounting as rules-based or principles-based. But, as the
following discussion suggests, at least as to these subjects, doing so
seems dubious.
B. Proposed Systems
Theorists and policymakers may attempt consciously to tilt a
legal or accounting system in favor of one end of the rules-principles
continuum or the other. But as the following discussion affirms, doing
so is more difficult than it may seem, at least in corporate law,
securities regulation, and accounting.
1. Emerging Economies and Corporate Law
In a well-known article, Professors Black and Kraakman draw
lessons from their experience developing an intensely rule-rich system
of corporate law for post-Soviet Russia. 210 The crucial theory
underpinning the system they created is the desperate need for
certainty-desperate because of its absence in the Soviet regime upon
1997 to 2002, as directed by section 704 of the Act, to prepare this study to identify areas of
financial disclosure most susceptible to fraud and other improper conduct).
207. The requirement for revenue recognition is completion or substantial completion of the
activity associated with the earnings process. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101,
Release No. SAB 101, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,936, 68,936, 68,940 (Dec. 9, 1999) (explaining that
"revenue should not be recognized until it is realized or realizable and earned," and discussing
the further requirement that distinct earnings processes must be separated).
208. SEC, SOX 704 REPORT, supra note 206, at 5. U.S. GAAP's expense recognition principle
is that expenses are to be recognized when incurred. Id. at 14.
209. Id. at 14, 19. These accounting standards include SFAS 144-Accounting for the
Impairment or Disposal of Long Lived Assets, SFAS 141-Business Combinations, and SFAS
146-Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities. See id. at 43 n.106.
210. Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1996).
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which Russia was forced to build its emerging economy. 2 11 The model
that these scholars develop helps to show that even the most conscious
effort to design a rule-rich system of corporate law, written from
scratch, cannot escape including significant provisions recognizable as
principles.
Professors Black and Kraakman refer to their model as "selfenforcing" in that its elements are designed to rely minimally on
participants
administrative or judicial enforcement-corporate
following the provisions can enforce them internally. This is important
for emerging economies because they lack a legal, economic, and social
infrastructure that supports enforcement of corporate law. The main
feature of the self-enforcing model is an emphasis on the use of brightline rules instead of principles. 212 However, Professors Black and
Kraakman recognize that their resulting model is not purely based on
bright-line rules because, as the following summary indicates, this is
impossible.
The self-enforcing model imposes specific mandates by statute.
In terms of shareholders, rules provide for supermajority shareholder
voting on designated transactions. 21 3 Shareholder consent is required
for an asset sale involving 50% or more of the company's book value
(unlike the U.S. requirement triggered by a sale of "all or
substantially all" assets). 21 4 Shareholder takeout rights arise when a
third party acquires ownership of 30% of the voting equity. The model
protects shareholder voting rights by a one-share, one-vote rule to
prevent insiders from accumulating voting power disproportionate to
economic stakes. This protection is reinforced by allowing
shareholders to nominate directors or to make other proposals. The
model also mandates disclosure, confidential voting, and cumulative
voting.
At the board level, the model requires certain features, such as
audit committees. To protect the value of cumulative voting, the model
requires minimum board size and prohibits staggered director terms.
A set portion of directors must also be independent of the corporation.
These directors are entrusted with exercising specified power over
designated extraordinary transactions, including self-interested
transactions. For such self-interested transactions, the model closely
follows the process provisions found in contemporary U.S. corporate
law statutes-approval by fully-informed, disinterested directors, or

211. See Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 353, 380-

87 (2006) (discussing the absence of the "rule of law" in Soviet Russia).
212. Black & Kraakman, supra note 210.
213. Id. at 1933, 1943.
214. Id. at 1955.
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shareholders. 215 These process provisions may make maximum use of
bright-line rules, but the approval criteria (being fully informed and
disinterested) can evince vagueness associated with principles.
Other contexts show an even broader range of provisions that
must be principle-like. A good example of this concerns third parties.
Their rights are protected mostly by contract in the United States, but
contractual protection may be insufficient in developing economies
that lack the requisite enforcement infrastructure. 216 The selfenforcing model restricts corporations from distributing assets to
shareholders through dividends and repurchases in derogation of
third-party interests. These distributions are permitted only so long
as, after the distribution, the corporation can pay its debts when due,
and its assets exceed its liabilities. 21 7 Thus, the self-enforcing model
polices distributions using Model Act-type restrictions, which I earlier
called principle-like, in contrast to the dense rule-like Delaware
218
provisions.
In addition to relying upon Model Act-type principles, these
distribution restrictions are limited because they police only dividends
and repurchases. Corporations are inventive in distributing assets to
shareholders using other devices in derogation of third-party rights.
To police these, the self-enforcing model relies upon vague general
principles found in U.S. fraudulent conveyance law, under which "a
transaction is improper if (i) the company does not receive equivalent
value, and (ii) the company fails an asset-based or liquidity-based
solvency test after the transaction." 2 19 Professors Black and
Kraakman recognize that this is a principle, not a rule, but note that
220
this is the best that can be done.
Appraisal rights offer another example of the inevitable need
for principles. In the self-enforcing model, appraisal rights are
required and apply to a broader range of transactions than in U.S.
corporate law. 221 As in U.S. law, implementation of the appraisal
remedy, even when contours are stated with rule-like particularity,
requires judicial analysis using principles, including principles of
financial valuation. 222 Professors Black and Kraakman appreciate

215. Id. at 1933.
216. Id. at 1967-68.
217. Id. at 1968-69.
218. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
219. Black & Kraakman, supra note 210, at 1969.
220. Id. ("[W]e can do no better than the vague standard, familiar from fraudulent
conveyance law.").
221. Id. at 1934.

222. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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these limitations, but find that there is similarly no better
223
alternative.
As a final example, rather than endorse typical U.S.-style
provisions concerning self-interested transactions, the self-enforcing
model provides a specific rule that disinterested directors must apply
when voting on such transactions. 224 The model favors such a specific
directive because it relieves directors from struggling with questions
of financial fairness (although the meaning of "disinterested" can
remain relatively vague). Relieving directors from struggling with the
vagueness of financial fairness is important for developing economies
that lack norms prevalent in developed countries, where people
understand financial fairness in terms of the relationship between
price and value.
This approach may promote the desired rule-like feature, but
the explanation reflects an important challenge facing the selfenforcing model generally. All provisions depend on the production of
norms, especially a norm of following rules. Without norms, why
would anyone follow the rules? Without adherence to rules, how can
productive corporate norms form? While it is possible that bright-line
rules alone can generate compliance norms, it seems more likely that
2 25
a system that combines rules with principles will do so.
Indeed, while Professors Black and Kraakman outline many
structural features of corporate law, they do not engage questions
ordinarily entangled with fiduciary duties, other than self-interested
transactions. Thus, for good reason, their model does not address
hostile takeover bids (they are absent or rare in emerging economies).
The self-enforcing model does not consider problems that arise under
the corporate opportunity doctrine. Adding these features to the model
would confirm the need for principles in creating a corporate law from
223. Black & Kraakman, supra note 210, at 1942-43.
224. Id. at 1935 (stating that independent directors shall approve an interested transaction
"only if the company receives consideration, in exchange for property or services delivered by the
company, that is worth no less than the market value of the property or services, and the
company pays consideration, in exchange for property or services, that does not exceed the
market value of the property or services").
225. Cf. Braithwaite, supra note 11, at 73 (citing Clifford D. Shearing & Richard V. Ericson,
Towards a Figurative Conception of Action, 42 BRIT. J. SOC. 481 (1991)). Professors Black and
Kraakman subsequently examined the forces contributing to the failure of the concurrent mass
privatization program Russia undertook, attributing this largely to corruption enabled by
insufficient protections against self-dealing by powerful corporate managers. Bernard Black,
Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What
Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1731 (2000). This is a problem that legal rules are illequipped to handle in cultures lacking requisite norms that can be promoted by elaborating
principles. See generally Kevin E. Davis, Law-Making in Small Jurisdictions,56 U. TORONTO
L.J. 151, 152-53 (2006) (exploring the possibility that smaller or less developed countries could
find it more appealing to adopt relatively vague standards rather than bright-line rules).
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scratch. 226 The scholars rightly opt for the term "self-enforcing model"
rather than "rules-based model," for the prescription shows the
improbability of fashioning a corporate law system that can fairly be
called rules-based.
2. Canada and Securities Regulation
Lawmakers in the Canadian province of British Columbia
("B.C.") are emphatic in announcing that they have drafted a
principles-based system of securities regulation. They propose this as
an alternative to what they see as a Canadian trend, led by Ontario,
to follow the U.S. "rules-based" model. The B.C. lawmakers contend
that their "new approach leaves behind the over-use of detailed and
prescriptive rules in favour of an outcomes-based approach founded on
time-tested principles of investor protection: disclosure to investors
227
and the regulation of dealers and advisers."
The proposed B.C. Act strives to express securities regulation
in broad terms, but many rule-like features appear. In outline, the Act
contains twelve parts, each part divided into numerous sections. Half
of these sections are then further divided into multiple divisions, and
then into numerous subsections. 228 Examples of provisions falling
toward the principles end of the continuum include laws governing
market participant conduct. The Act states general prohibitions (no
engaging in manipulation, fraud, or misrepresentation-as defined
elsewhere with greater specificity). 229 It also bans "unfair practices"such a vague concept that the drafters further delineated the principle
in the following series of mandates: no unreasonable pressure, no
2 30
taking advantage of others, and no imposing inequitable terms.
The Act's definition of "material information" is principle-like,
as in the United States. The proposed legislation defines material
information as "information relating to the business, operations or
securities of an issuer that would reasonably be expected to

226. See Rado Bohinc & Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized
Slovenia, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 49, 53 (2001) (providing an account of Slovenia's new corporate law,
described as "property-rights based," and using the German co-determination model without
using the terms "rules-based" or "principles-based"); Uriel Procaccia, Crafting a Corporate Code
from Scratch, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 629 (1996) (providing an account of Israel's new marketbased corporate code, also without using such other terms).
227. B.C. SECURITIES

COMMISSION,

QUESTIONS

& ANSWERS:

NEW

BRITISH COLUMBIA

SECURITIES ACT
1
(2004),
available at
http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/2004NewLegislationQ-A.pdf.
228. British Columbia Securities Act, Bill 38, 5th Session, 37th Parliament (2004) (not
enacted as law) [hereinafter BC Securities Bill].
229. Id. pt. 5, §§ 27-28.
230. Id. pt. 6, § 29.
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significantly affect the value or market price of the issuer or a security
of the issuer." 231 It uses the term "material information" twenty-two
times. The Act, however, also supplies a different but parallel
definition of "significant information" applicable to mutual funds. It
uses the two terms together in numerous contexts but separately
when prescribing prospectus disclosure requirements as between
mutual funds and other issuers. 232 Principles alone are insufficient to
implement that distinction.
Several examples of provisions falling toward the rules end of
the continuum also appear in the Act. For instance, the Act's
definitions section contains specific (non-vague) statements of the
terms "adviser," "affiliate," "associate," "derivative," "insider," "market
participant" (listing fifteen different categories of persons), "offering,"
and "trade." Subsequent sections contain specific definitions of
additional terms. 233 The definition of "security" lists seven categories
of instruments. 234 Given historical experience with novel and
unanticipated instruments, one wonders whether this definition of
security, which is, in any event, rule-like, not principle-like, is
sufficient to cover future circumstances. 235 The effort to define
misrepresentation is particularly cumbersome, more nearly evincing
236
attributes of rules than of principles.
All the B.C. Act's provisions concerning registration and
offerings are stated in vague terms, exhibiting principle-like features.
Even so, they also contain rules, and many rely on the securities
commission to provide additional regulation. Registration provisions
require registration before a participant may trade or advise (a

231. Id. pt. 1, § 1.
232. Id. pt. 4, § 20.
233. Id. pt. 1, § 1.
234. Id.
235. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-301 (1946) (taking a broad, flexible
approach to defining investment contracts, a subset of "securities"); see, e.g., Shanah D. Glick,
Note, Are Viatical Settlements Securities Within the Regulatory Control of the Securities Act of
1933?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 968-84 (1993) (arguing that viatical settlements are not
"securities" as defined under the Securities Act of 1933).
236. Misrepresentation is defined as:
(a) [I]n relation to an issuer (i) an untrue statement of material information or
significant information, (ii) the failure to disclose material information or significant
information that is required to be disclosed, or (iii) the omission of material
information or significant information from a statement, if that information is
necessary to prevent the statement from being false or misleading in the
circumstances, or (b) in any other circumstance, a statement about something that a
reasonable investor would consider important (i) in making a decision to trade a
security, or (ii) in relation to a trading or advising relationship with a person, if the
statement is untrue or omits information necessary to prevent the statement from
being false or misleading in the circumstances.
BC Securities Bill, supra note 228, pt. 1, § 1.
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rule). 237 The offering provisions prohibit offerings absent filing and
receiving a receipt for a prospectus (a rule). The prospectus must be
"inthe required form" (a rule, although the statute does not specify
the form, presumably leaving this to the commission, which can use
238
rules, principles, or both).
The Act's insider trading provisions also demonstrate an effort
to articulate pure principles, but equally succumb, through pressure
for clarity, to rule-like expression. Thus insiders must "within the
prescribed time" (a rule) "file a report in the required form" (another
rule). 239 Again, the commission must establish the prescription and
requirements. Subsequent insider reports are required under stated
circumstances (rules).240 The law bans insider trading and expressly
states that this includes tipping. These provisions require defining the
additional term "connected person." 24 1 This is a dense and complex
definition bearing qualities of a rule, not a principle. 242 The stated ban
on insider trading is likewise dense, resembling a synthesis of pre-Act
case law or enforcement actions-less a rule or a principle than a
summary of prior applications.
So, notwithstanding conscious ambitions to create principlesbased securities regulation, the B.C. approach does not quite live up to
its own characterization. While the Act contains extensive provisions
written in principle-like fashion, it cannot escape explicitly
incorporating rules, including specific action requirements, concept
definitions, and efforts at specification associated with rules. It also
leaves many details to be written by the securities commissionmeaning that the full-blown system of securities regulation would
likely include many more rules than appear in the Act. Moreover, once

237. Id. pt. 3, § 14.
238. Id. pt. 4, § 18.
239. Id. pt. 4, § 25.
240. Id. pt. 4, § 26.
241. Id. pt. 4, § 30.
242. The B.C. Act's definition of "connected person" reads as follows:
Connected person means, in relation to an issuer, (a) an insider, officer, employee,
affiliate or associate of the issuer; (b) a person that is making or proposing to make a
takeover bid for the securities of the issuer; (c) a person that is proposing to (i) become
a party to a reorganization or business combination with the issuer, or (ii) acquire a
substantial portion of the property of the issuer; (d) a person engaging in or proposing
to engage in any business or professional activity with or on behalf of the issuer or
with or on behalf of a person referred to in paragraph (b) or (c); (e) an insider, officer,
a
employee, affiliate or associate of a person referred to in paragraph (b), (c) or (d); (f)
person with inside information, if the information was obtained at a time when the
person was a connected person under paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), or (g) a person
that obtained inside information from another person (i) who, at the time, was a
connected person under this definition, including this paragraph, and (ii) whom the
person knew or reasonably should have known was a connected person.
Id. pt. 6, § 30.
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the provisions are applied, the result would be even more rules,
creating a systemic character that defies classification using the
24 3
binary terminology of rules-based and principles-based.
3. United States and Accounting
Congress and the SEC have adopted the rhetoric of principlesbased systems as well. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed the SEC to
conduct a "study on the adoption by the U.S. financial reporting
system of a principles-based accounting system." 244 This directive
implicitly suggests that the current U.S. accounting system is rules245
based, a mistaken but widely shared belief.
In its study, the SEC identified the typical trade-offs of rules
versus principles. It then came down squarely on the side of promoting
a principles-based system, although it labeled it an objectives-oriented
approach. Consistent with conceptions outlined in Part I of this
Article, the SEC observed that accounting provisions reside along a
continuum according to their "degrees of specificity . . . ranging from
the abstract, at one end, to the very specific at the other."246 The SEC
also denominated a class of principle-only provisions, defined as "highlevel [provisions] with little if any operational guidance." 247 The classic
example of the latter is the concept of a reasonable speed in driving
regulations. Such "principle-only" provisions require exercising
judgment without a reliable framework for doing so-and risk ad hoc,
arbitrary enforcement.
The SEC minted and endorsed the concept of an "objectivesoriented" approach to assert that resulting provisions would "land
solidly between the two ends of this spectrum." 248 Falling in line with
contemporary global terminology, the SEC opined that an objectives
orientation would best be achieved using "principles-based" provisions.
The SEC explained that, in contrast to rules-based systems, a
principles-based system uses concise statements of principle with the
related objectives incorporated as an integral part. 249 Ideally, its
provisions contain no or few exceptions, a modicum of guidance, and
243. Cf. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, OR, THE WHALE 406 (positing a famous statement of
two simple principles governing property rights when fishing-a "Fast-Fish belongs to the party
fast to it" and a "Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it"-but lamenting
that "what plays the mischief with this masterly code is the admirable brevity of it, which
necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it").
244. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(d), 15 U.S.C. § 7266 (Supp. II 2002).
245. See supranote 2 (citing sources).
246. SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note 156.
247. Id.
248. Id.

249. Id.
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no bright-line tests. Instead, provisions are derived from an
underlying coherent conceptual framework. 250 Systems with these
attributes are objectives-oriented because application entails fulfilling
the objective and, in doing so, minimizes strategic evasion.
Articulation entails coherence across the regulatory terrain; it
eschews exceptions that produce inconsistencies and omits bright-line
rules that lead to different regulatory consequences for slightly
25 1
different fact patterns.
Although the SEC position is superficially appealing, some
perspective is in order. As a background matter, there was an
apparent dichotomy between complying with GAAP and providing a
fair financial presentation. 252 With some fanfare, the SEC addressed
this possible dichotomy after Enron Corp. imploded by saying that if
complying with GAAP does not produce a fair presentation, then
compliance with GAAP is subordinated to promoting a fair
presentation. 25 3 In such cases, GAAP must be overridden.
This stance threatened the existing financial reporting system,
which for decades had understood, as a matter of law 254 and

250. Id.
251. Id.

252. See United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that an
accountant is not insulated from liability solely on the basis of proving conformity to generally
accepted accounting principles); James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting:
The PCAOB and the Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 319-20 (2003)
(discussing Simon in current context).
253. SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note 156; see also Certification of Disclosure in Companies'
Quarterly and Annual Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8,124, Exchange Act Release No.
46,427, Investment Companies Act Release No. 25,722, 78 SEC Docket 875, 880 (Aug. 28, 2002)
(stating that auditors' certification is not limited to whether financial statements conform to
GAAP); Floyd Norris, An Old Case Is Returning to Haunt Auditors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2002, at
C1 (noting how the incumbent SEC Chairman had been touting Simon).
254. Early in its history, the SEC took the position that compliance with GAAP is not a
defense to allegations of inadequate disclosure. In re Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 SEC 975,
1058-59 (1942). Some cases from the 1970s, in addition to United States v. Simon, did so, as well.
E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1085 (D. Del. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 599
F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing In re Associated Gas & Electric Co. and Herzfeld v.Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath when holding that compliance with GAAP is "not a complete
defense to charges of inadequate disclosure"); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 540
F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The full disclosure by insiders, which is mandated by the securities laws,
coincides with and reinforces the accountant's professional duty to investors who read his
reports. This duty cannot be fulfilled merely by following generally accepted accounting
principles."). These cases were cited with moderate frequency in the latter 1970s and early 1980s
but then fell into desuetude. Case law thereafter suggested that compliance with GAAP
discharged one's obligations in financial reporting. E.g., SEC v. Price Waterhouse, 797 F. Supp.
1217, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding that because Price Waterhouse's accounting procedures were
in conformity with GAAP, they were not so defective as to support an inference of fraud). The old
line of cases has been revived in the post-Enron era. See In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec. Litig.,
322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that compliance with GAAP does not insulate
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practice, 255 that complying with GAAP would yield a fair presentation.
Conversely, if too rule-bound, compliance with GAAP would impair
the possibility of meeting the principle of "fair presentation." A crisis
loomed: if the widely held assumption of U.S. GAAP as rule-excessive
was accurate, then it had to be reinvented-post haste. True, it might
be possible to reconcile the relationship between GAAP and fair
presentation through techniques such as presumptions, qualifications,
or scope limitations. But at a broad level, if complying with rule-bound
GAAP meant absence of a fair presentation, and fair presentation is
privileged, then GAAP would become functionally irrelevant.
Rhetoric notwithstanding, the assumption of GAAP's rulebound nature was false. The SEC found that existing U.S. GAAP is a
combination of rules and principles. While expressing some greater
affection for the principles end of the spectrum, the SEC declared the
existing mixture to be substantially effective, and simply re-labeled it
an objectives-oriented system. The SEC concluded that, under such a

system, there should be limited need to use GAAP overrides because
complying with objectives-oriented GAAP yields financial statements
that are fairly presented. 256 This conclusion thus resolved what
accountants from liability under the securities laws). An alternative means of imposing liability
despite compliance with GAAP invokes an SEC rule that requires financial statements to
include, in addition to that expressly required, any information necessary to avoid misleading
investors. SEC v. Caserta, 75 F. Supp. 2d 79, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Exchange Act Rule 12b-20, 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2007).
255. This belief is embedded in the standard form for an independent auditor's unqualified
opinion, which reads as follows: "In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above
present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of X Company as of (at) December
31, [20xx], and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended, in
conformity with generally accepted accountingprinciples."See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 126 (Feb. 20, 2007). AICPA explains how these concepts of "present fairly" and
GAAP relate to each other: "The independent auditor's judgment concerning the 'fairness' of the
overall presentation of financial statements should be applied within the framework of generally
accepted accounting principles." THE MEANING OF "PRESENT FAIRLY IN CONFORMITY WITH
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES," Statement on Auditing Standards No. 69 .03
(Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1992), reprinted in AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS AU § 411 (2007). This

professional stance implies that there are not two separate requirements--of presenting fairly
and in conformity with GAAP-but that the two are intertwined. On the other hand, professional
standards authorized departures from GAAP when doing so was necessary to prevent financial
statements from being "misleading." REPORTS ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, Statement

on Auditing Standards No. 58

.14 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1988), reprinted in

AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, CODIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON AUDITING
STANDARDS AU § 508.14 (2007). Such opinions have been rare. See DAN M. GUY ET AL., WILEY

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO GAAS 361 (2004) ("Only a handful of such reports have ever been
issued."); see also id. at 365 (excerpting an example from 1976).
256. FASB's 2002 proposal of a principles approach to standard setting contemplated
elevating the requirement of fair presentation to overarching importance so that accounting
choices would reflect underlying economic reality. FASB, 2002 PROPOSAL, supra note 2, at 1-2, 4,
7. The SEC's conclusion in its report may explain why this proposal did not appear to gain
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otherwise loomed as a crisis: that U.S. GAAP would have to be
scrapped if it could not satisfy the fair presentation principle.
The SEC's elaborate study of the rules-principles dichotomy
shows the dichotomy's falsity. The SEC ultimately concluded that U.S.
GAAP is a mixture of principles and rules and, despite a modest
gesture encouraging greater use of principles when possible,
designated neither as inherently superior. Instead, it embraces what
it believes to be a hybrid, which it calls an "objectives-oriented"
system. 257 In sum, the system is a different name for the prevailing
variety of rules and principles, all intended to promote financial
statements that "fairly present" financial condition and performance.
This resolution of the false dichotomy is correct and suggests
that the struggle was more cathartic than substantive. The issue is
not whether a rules-based system or a principles-based system is
superior; as such, categories are null sets for complex regulatory
systems. It is whether a rule or principle is superior for a given
situation, an outcome that depends on trade-offs (such as certainty
versus context), how rules and principles are applied, and how they
interact. The ideal form varies across subject matters within a
system-in corporate law, securities regulation, and accounting. The
SEC correctly concludes the question is one of objectives.
III. THEORIES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE RHETORIC
Many countries around the world-plus Delaware judges and
their apologists in corporate law, British Columbia in securities
regulation, and even Congress and the SEC when addressing
accounting-are invoking the terminology of principles-based systems.
The foregoing discussion counsels skepticism about whether such
systems are possible, let alone desirable. At best, it may be possible
within the universe of rules and principles to weight a system heavily
towards principles (or rules). Why leaders appeal to this
characterization is a curiosity that the following discussion explores. It
considers three non-exclusive possibilities summarized in the
Introduction: the regulatory, ethical, and political hypotheses.

traction. British accounting experts describe such a stance as involving a "true and fair
override," while that usage is not prevalent among U.S. accountants. See, e.g., David Alexander
& Simon Archer, On Economic Reality, Representational Faithfulness and the 'True and Fair
Override,' 33 ACCT. & Bus. RES. 3, 3 (2003).
257. SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note 156.
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A. Regulatory
A possible explanation for the widespread talk of "principlesbased systems" is to support regulatory resistance to otherwise
powerful forces generating rules. In many contexts in recent years, the
trend has been moving towards rules and away from principles. 25
Offsetting these trends by emphasizing principles can promote more
cautious compliance attitudes among regulated actors.
1. Trends Favoring Rules
Five trends favoring rules can be identified. First, people seek
certainty, especially in financial markets. Risk-assessment tools
increasingly enable defining and measuring a range of risks, from
interest and currency rate fluctuations and commodity price changes
to political and weather hazards. 259 This ability to measure such a
variety of risks stokes an appetite to similarly measure regulatory and
enforcement risk. Accordingly, the perceived certainty that
accompanies rules compared to principles leads to the demand for
rules.
Second, the "new governance" paradigm in administrative law
envisions regulators and compliers increasingly participating together
in promulgation exercises. 260 The administrative state has evolved
into one of open government, collaborative governance, and extensive
use of private organizations in setting standards. 26 1 In such regulatory
258. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 933-34 (2002) (noting that while plaintiffs once had
argued for a broad interpretation of the good faith standard in cases brought by bond holders and
preferred stock holders, courts instead "invented a restrictive variant"); Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 105-06 (2004) (stating that the 1976 revision of the
Copyright Act "provides a highly detailed and specific set of rules," unlike previous acts, which
had left the courts "to craft more via the fair use doctrine"); Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn's
FadingImprint on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541,
564-72 (2000) (noting that while the original intent of the drafters of the Uniform Commercial
Code was to facilitate a "purposive interpretation" of the Code, the growing trend has been
toward a "textualist approach").
259. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 199 (2006) (discussing

different methods of risk management).
260. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
545-49 (2000) (arguing that administrative law is "a set of negotiated relationships" between the
public and the private sector); Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative
State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 21-22 (1997) (advocating for a system of "collaborative governance"
in the administrative process); see also Paul R. Verkuil, Public Law Limitations on Privatization
of Government Functions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 397, 466-69 (2006) (arguing that, despite the increase
in privatization, the public sector must retain its influence in order to provide private sector
guidance and oversight).
261. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE

DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992) ("If we accept that sound policy analysis is about understanding
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settings, it is not surprising that resulting articulations would be less
vague, with constituents asserting needs for qualifications, exceptions,
262
and other features of rules.
A third factor driving rules-proliferation is the ascendancy of
"interpretive textualism." This refers to the practice of emphasizing
literal expressions when interpreting statutory or regulatory
language, a practice especially prevalent among judges. 263 The
practice resists infusing those materials with penumbral principles.
Legislators and regulators may respond to this trend with increasing
care and attention to selected words, consciously reducing vagueness
when drafting, thereby yielding rules. This can, in turn, become a part
264
of legal culture and lead practitioners to follow suit.
Fourth, increasing specialization and fragmentation create
incentives among proprietors and professionals to claim expertise and
among regulators to claim turf.265 The value of rents that such groups
can claim is greater when specialized rules govern rather than broad
general principles. Such specialization and fragmentation arise in
securities markets because old-fashioned industrial issuers differ
markedly from mutual funds, which in turn differ from hedge funds.
private regulation . . and how it is interdependent with state regulation, then interesting
possibilities open up to steer the mix of private and public regulation."); JAY A. SIGLER & JOSEPH
E. MURPHY, INTERACTIVE CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 43-44 (1988) (arguing for a system of
"interactive compliance" between government and business to avoid either rigid regulatory policy
or excessive deregulation).
262. E.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5(c)
(2000) (section 27A of the 1933 Act and section 21E of the 1934 Act) (detailing when one is liable
for making a forward-looking statement); Securities Act Rule 175, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (2007)
(detailing which statements made by an issuer or outside reviewer obtained by the issuer are
deemed not to be fraudulent as long as they were made in good faith or with a reasonable basis);
Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2007) (same); NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS,
NASD MANUAL (2007) (specifying rules of broker conduct).
263. See, e.g., Saby Ghoshray, To Understand Foreign Court Citation: Dissecting
Originalism, Dynamism, Romanticism, and Consequentialism, 69 ALB. L. REV. 709, 717
("Anchored in the text, structure, and history of the [statute], textualism seeks the most literal
meaning, free from the perceptive idealism of broader social purpose."). For a further inquiry into
the nuances between textualism and intentionalism, see Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91
VA. L. REV. 347, 376, which states: "[N]o mainstream judge is interested solely in the literal
definitions of a statute's words, and textualists are willing to deviate in certain ways from the
baseline that conventional meaning provides. Still, textualists prefer such deviations to be
guided by relatively rule-like principles."
264. See Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary's Role in Fostering
Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 195 (2004) ('To the extent a GAAR is successful in
changing judicial approaches to statutory interpretation in tax shelter cases, practitioners' views
will change to reflect the new legal landscape.").
265. Illustrative are debates concerning derivatives regulation among the SEC, the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the International Swap Dealers
Association (ISDA). See Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation,
22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 421, 429-32 (2001) (noting that competition between the SEC and the
CFTC has resulted in "a nasty and inefficient 'turf battle'" as opposed to increased efficiency).
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Similarly, common stock and straight debt differ markedly from
preferred stock, call or put options, asset-backed debt, strips, and
derivatives. In sum, rules result.
Fifth, professional advisors participating in transactions
demand rules, not principles. Sometimes they need support from
specific rulebooks to cite when encouraging clients to take
conservative or prudential approaches. 266 Litigation risk bolsters this
demand, especially in accounting, where auditors demand rules rather
than principles. 267 Across all settings where risks and pressures of
rent-seeking are high-whether for those seeking clean audit letters,
legal opinions, or no-action letters-rules that limit or eliminate
268
discretion help to deflect such appeals.
2. A Need for Principles
These impressive forces may generate more complex and
technical rules than is ideal, weakening the weight or vividness of
associated principles. When more rules are produced and fewer or
weaker principles are available to mediate them, the traditionally
accepted trade-offs between rules and principles may be upset and the
benefits of their iterative relationship impaired. An excess of rules
makes it easier to treat rules as blueprints to achieve absurd results.
A useful response to excessive rule production is a regulatory
emphasis on principles, in fact and in rhetoric. This inclination
provides a plausible explanation for prevailing inclinations to
celebrate "principles-based systems" of law or accounting.
In this view, a "principles-based system" provides broad
regulatory enforcement power to police not just compliance with
specific rules but fulfillment of broad general principles. It does so by

266. See Bratton, supra note 196, at 1049 (arguing that rules "should with some frequency
lead the auditor to say no to aggressive treatments chosen by clients, on grounds of full
disclosure and conservatism"); Michael Gibbins, Steve Salterio & Alan Webb, Evidence About
Auditor-Client Management Negotiation Concerning Client's Financial Reporting, 39 J. ACCT.

RES. 534, 539 (2001) ("Unambiguous standards or clear statutory powers increase the general
influence of the auditor."). But see Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the
Devolution of Corporate FinancialReporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 17 (2004) ("[A]s the

accounting norms themselves became more complicated and subjective, the ability to confidently
say 'no' to a client diminished.").
267. See, e.g., George J. Benston, Public (U.S.) Compared to Private (U.K.) Regulation of
Corporate Financial Disclosure, 51 ACCT. REV. 483, 486-87 (1976) (explaining that the complex
rules governing auditor activity are in part designed to avoid the significant cost of litigation);
Stephen A. Zeff, A Perspective on the U.S. Public/PrivateSector Approach to the Regulation of
FinancialReporting, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 52, 65 (1995) (discussing how auditors want to back up
their clients' financial reporting with explicit provisions of GAAP).
268. See Stewart E. Sterk, Information Production and Rent-Seeking in Law School
Administration:Rules and Discretion,83 B.U. L. REV. 1141, 1148-50 (2003).
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equipping regulatory agencies that have rule-making authority with
enforcement power to emphasize principles rather than rules to
bolster their enforcement arsenals. 2 9 Making this capability salient
can elicit greater cautiousness among regulated actors by curbing the
temptation to exploit rules when doing so produces absurd results.
To illustrate, compare the rules-heavy, self-enforcing model of
corporate law with the principles-rich British Columbia securities
regulation proposal and the principles-encouraging SEC study on U.S.
GAAP. 270 The self-enforcing model is designed to minimize the role of
external enforcement in favor of internal enforcement. To that end, it
relies as much as possible on rules. The British Columbia proposal
and SEC study reflect the opposite appetite. They favor principles and
take seriously the possibility of expansive external enforcement
powers based on those principles.
Regulators periodically rely on principles in their enforcement
arsenal to address discrete bouts of deviance in which rules either do
not exist or are not clearly applicable. 271 For example, the SEC used
principles to launch its campaign against insider trading in the mid1980s. 272 It did so to address plagues associated with junk bonds in the
early 1990s and, along with state attorneys general, research analysts
and mutual fund market timing in the early 2000s. 273 It used
principles in enforcement to address novel problems arising from
technological innovation and political change at the dawns of the
275
Internet 274 and globalization.

269. See ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 301-02 (1982) (arguing that the SEC "can easily formulate
new legal principles through ad hoc enforcement actions rather than through the rule-making
process"); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 355 (1978)
(discussing the difficulties in assigning adjudicatory functions to administrative agencies); David
L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Agency Policy, 78
HARv. L. REV. 921, 940-41 (1965) (discussing the amorphous principles that may result when
administrative decisions are made in an adjudicatory context).
270. See supra notes 227-57 and accompanying text.
271. See William R. McLucas, J. Lynn Taylor & Susan A. Mathews, A Practitioner'sGuide to
the SEC's Investigative and Enforcement Process, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 53, 67-68 (1997) (describing
the SEC's enforcement procedures with respect to investment companies).
272. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
273. Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 118-21 (2004) (describing the analyst and mutual funds
conflicts).
274. E.g., Spencer, Litigation Release No. 14,856, 61 SEC Docket 1679 (Mar. 29, 1996)
(relating to an Internet solicitation of investors promising 50% returns); Frye, Litigation Release
No. 14,720, 60 SEC Docket 1787 (Nov. 15, 1995) (involving an Internet solicitation of investor
promising risk-free profits); Odulo, Litigation Release No. 14,616, 60 SEC Docket 120 (Aug. 24,
1995) (pertaining to an Internet solicitation promising 20% return); Odulo, Litigation Release
No. 14,591, 59 SEC Docket 2538-39 (Aug. 7, 1995) (announcing the filing of the complaint and
consent to judgment in the same matter).

20071

"PRINCIPLES-BASEDSYSTEMS"

1475

These examples of enforcing principles support the regulatory
hypothesis as an enforcement-expanding device. However, they
simultaneously show a descriptive weakness in this hypothesis to
explain the recent rise of principles-based vocabulary: such
discretionary enforcement always exists as an option. 276 A difference
may be how, in the given examples, deviance was isolated and not
closely connected to extant rules. In contrast, the Enron era created a
perception that too many rules bred pervasive "creative compliance"technical adherence to rules that lacked fidelity to their spirit.27 7 As
an example, people could design deals that met clearly applicable
accounting rules expressed in numerical thresholds, such as 3% or
50%, despite absurd results that impaired the principle of fair
presentation. 278
However, the regulatory hypothesis faces other weaknesses as
a descriptive matter. First, the rhetoric about principles-based
systems is stronger than a mere shift in regulatory strategy. It does
not speak to a balance between rules and principles, but pronounces
the emphatic superiority of principles. Second, while the explanation
may appear plausible for the SEC and British Columbia, it carries
little credibility in the case of Delaware, which is notoriously reluctant
279
to impose liability on directors of its corporations.
Third, regulators responded to the recent debacles with new
rules, as well as new principles and rhetoric. For example, in response
to Enron chairman Ken Lay's disingenuous defense that he did not
know the details of the corporation's financial statements, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act prescribed a rule that corporate officers must
275. See Candies, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7,263, Exchange Act Release No. 36,865,
61 SEC Docket 758, 760-62 (Feb. 21, 1996) (invoking a cease-and-desist order against a law firm
assisting in a scheme to violate registration requirements by distributing abroad unregistered
stock that was promptly resold into the United States); Scorpion Techs., Inc., Litigation Release
No. 14,814, 61 SEC Docket 749, 750 (Feb. 9, 1996) (involving an injunction to stop an illegal
Regulation S offering of stock in 20 countries).
276. Whether it should be exercised and how the choice should be made are open questions.
See James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2007).
277. See Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 848 (1991) (exploring how "[c]reative
compliance thrives on a narrow legalistic approach to rules and legal control").
278. Cf. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 913, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[A]n
accountant must not blindly apply accounting conventions without reviewing the transaction to
determine whether it makes any economic sense and without first finding that the transaction is
realistic and has economic substance that would justify the booking of the transaction that
occurred.... It seems that the accounting firm was more concerned with attempts of
conscientious regulators to deal with the savings and loans industry's severe crisis than the
'creative accounting' of its 'high flying' client."). My example is hypothetical, certainly not based
on Enron, which flatly violated such rules. Bratton, supra note 196, at 1041.
279. See Black et al., supra note 111.
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certify that they know the details of financial statements. 28 0 Similarly,
in response to the era's widespread accounting aggressions, the SEC
adopted rules to police the use of non-GAAP financial measures and
28 1
off-balance-sheet financing arrangements.
The regulatory hypothesis poses two additional difficulties as a
normative matter. Both arise from how this strategy can tip the
balance unduly towards the principles end of the continuum. First,
this can induce excessively cautious compliance outlooks that impair
the benefits of rules (which, in this context, could include deterring
desirable risk-taking). 28 2 Second, a determined enforcement preference
to focus on principles instead of rules could backfire when incongruent
with accepted notions of fairness and legitimacy.
Additional qualifications concerning the regulatory hypothesis
appear from isolating the specific case of accounting. Consider the
requirement that financial statements both comply with GAAP and
provide a fair presentation. 28 3 One can imagine an accounting system
weighted towards two ends of a spectrum: one that emphasizes
compliance with GAAP and another that emphasizes a fair
presentation. Part I of this Article mentioned a hypothetical regime
that used solely a principle of fair presentation, questioning how that
could be feasible absent at least some rules, such as those contained in

280. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302(a), 906, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. II 2002); see SEC,
CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN COMPANIES' QUARTERLY AND ANNUAL REPORTS, RELEASE No.
33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002) (adopting rules as directed by section 302(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act);
Michael Perino, Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 671, 681-85 (2002) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the new
securities fraud crime).
281. SEC Reg. G, 17 C.F.R. § 244.101 (2007) (defining non-GAAP financial measures and
those registrants subject to the regulation); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis
About Off-Balance Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act
Release No. 8182, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, Financial Reporting Release No. 67,
International Series Release No. 1266, 79 SEC Docket 1251, 1254-68 (Jan. 28, 2003) (requiring
the disclosure of off-balance sheet arrangements); Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial
Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8,176, Exchange Act Release No. 47,226, Financial
Reporting Release No. 65, 79 SEC Docket 1057, 1058-62 (Jan. 22, 2003) (requiring the disclosure
of non-GAAP financial measures); Securities Act Release No. 8,039, Exchange Act Release No.
45,124, Financial Reporting Release No. 59, 76 SEC Docket 896, 896-97 (Dec. 4, 2001)
(cautioning public companies using pro forma financial information and alerting investors to the
dangers of it). These are interesting specimens because the SEC describes the documents as
taking "principles-based" approaches despite showing rule-like qualities. See Partnoy, supra note
33, at 1276 (discussing how the SEC "shifted the regulatory regime toward rule-based tabular
disclosure").
282. See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 975-79 (1984) (analyzing uncertainty under a negligence
standard to demonstrate how overcompliance with a certain standard may not optimize social
costs).
283. See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
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GAAP. 28 4 Part II explained that, in the decades before the Enron era,
participants in U.S. financial reporting generally assumed that
compliance with GAAP would automatically deliver a fair
28 5
presentation.
The former hypothetical privileges the principle while the
latter may be seen to privilege rules. To the extent that privileging
rules can prevent meeting the principle, the emphasis on principlesbased systems is an effort to elevate the principles to a position of
primacy. This explanation is consistent with the SEC's post-Enron
emphasis on earlier case law that required overriding GAAP when
28 6
necessary to provide a fair presentation.
Viewing the rhetoric as enhancing the fair presentation
principle is normatively appealing. But the effort has been halfhearted. Indeed, it may be a product of how the auditing industry
would prefer not to debate whether it should assume more
responsibility for discretionary accounting choices. Auditors
steadfastly resist responsibility for exercising discretion over the
selection of accounting treatments when choices are available. They
instead insist that this is management's responsibility and that
auditors should assess only whether managerial choice is within a
range of acceptability-not whether it is the best treatment. 2 7 It is
better for auditors to generate an excited debate on the character of
accounting provisions as rules versus principles than cast attention on
the duties and liability risks of managers versus auditors in selecting
28 8
and applying those provisions.
B. Ethical
A second possibility is that the rhetoric of principles-based
systems is part of a more general exhortation. What Enron-type
scandals revealed was not a failure of rules but the failure of a
different set of principles: ethics. The global embrace of principlesbased systems may be intended less as a description of the relative
specificity or ex ante content of provisions as between rules and
principles and more of an appeal to ethics. Principles-basedregulation
may be a call to ethical principles. This would also explain why the
284. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
285. See supra text accompanying notes 189-91.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 252-53.
287. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

371 (2006).
288. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92
MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (exploring how to encourage auditor willingness to undertake
duties that the current liability system discourages them from undertaking).
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global rhetoric uses the term "principles" rather than the term
"standards" that is more prevalent in the legal literature. 2 9 If this
290
hypothesis is correct, labels may matter more than some think.
1. Hortatory
The rise of enthusiasm for principles-based
systems
corresponds to the post-Enron discourse that lamented laxity in
business ethics. 291 Some worried that professionalism had diminished
in favor of pure profit maximization, and notions of the public good
and public service among the professions needed reaffirmation. 292 The
discourse exhibited a quest to restore a heightened sense of business
and professional ethics.
The rhetoric of principles-based systems may be a byproduct of
this quest. This may be so because, while regulatory tools can promote
ethical norms, they cannot do so alone. 293 Consider again the practice
of creative compliance involving literal obedience to law while evading
its spirit. 294 To an extent, creative compliance is unobjectionable, as
when structuring a business combination to avoid triggering
shareholder voting or appraisal rights, or designing a lease to obtain
capital treatment. However, when done overzealously, as during the
Enron era, the practice of creative compliance is treacherous. Either
way, neither law nor accounting can do anything to punish compliance
with itself. True, in corporate law, equitable principles can police mere

289. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
290. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (noting how some scholars dismiss the
proliferation of labels to describe types of laws as nominalism with limited substantive import).
291. E.g., Bill Witherell, Corporate Governance: Stronger Principles for Better Market
Integrity, OECD OBSERVER, May 2004, at 41 (announcing release of OECD, Revised Principles of
Corporate Governance, retaining previous "principles-based" approach but emphasizing need to
reexamine the previous guidelines in response to global corporate debacles).
292. See William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1283 (2002) ("Enron in collapse was wrought into the fabric of our corporate
governance system .. "); Peter C. Kostant, Sacred Cows or Cash Cows: The Abuse of Rhetoric in
Justifying Some Current Norms of TransactionalLawyering, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 49, 63-78
(2001) (illustrating the role transactional attorneys play in promoting profit-driven corporate
wrongdoing); Bevis Longstreth, Problems in the Corporate Bar as It Appears to a Retired
Practitioner, 31 MONT. LAW. 22, 22, 32-33 (2006) (lamenting how the "gold standard of
professional greats turned to dross" and suggesting several solutions to the problem); W. Bradley
Wendel, Professionalismas Interpretation,99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (2005) ("Professionalism
stands in opposition to the view of many lawyers that excellence in lawyering means engaging in
'creative and aggressive' structuring of transactions for the benefit of clients, even though the
transactions are designed to evade regulatory requirements enacted to protect investors.").
293. To paraphrase T. S. Eliot, regulators cannot realistically expect to fashion a system so
perfect that no one needs to be good.
294. See McBarnet & Whelan, supra note 277, at 849 ("Creative compliance uses formalism
to avoid legal control .... ").
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technical compliance, 295 and in securities regulation, the broad-gauged
anti-abuse principles contribute. 296 But, in general, regulatory pursuit
297
of creative compliance is Quixotic-except perhaps through rhetoric.
Recognizing this limit, regulators turned to codes of business
ethics. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act required the SEC to promulgate
regulations requiring public disclosure of whether a company has a
code of ethics for senior officers and, if not, why not. 298 Companies
must promptly disclose changes, including waivers, to ethics codes.
The New York Stock Exchange contemporaneously imposed a
requirement that listed companies adopt and disclose a code of
business conduct and ethics. 299 The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were
amended in 2004 to take express account of whether an enterprise
promoted business ethics, including through the adoption of formal
codes. 300
The resulting codes of ethics are fascinating: they are all brief,
abstract, simple, and similar to each other, often emphasizing
adherence to the "spirit of the law." 30 1 The codes may be truly
"principles-based"-they are vague and contain barely a trace of
"rules."30 2 While promulgators of law and accounting cannot create
principles-based systems, using that vocabulary can reinforce the
lessons in the codes. This interpretation of the rhetoric as emphasizing

295. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting the Schnell doctrine in Delaware
judicial administration).
296. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70.
297. The limitations on general anti-abuse principles appear vividly in tax law, where the
principles exist but rarely are enforced.
298. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 7264 (Supp. II 2002) ("[C]ode[s] of ethics" are
"such standards as are reasonably necessary to promote (1) honest and ethical conduct ... (2)
full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable disclosure ... and (3) compliance with applicable
governmental rules and regulations.").
299. NYSE, INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A(10) (2003); see also Order Approving
NYSE and Nasdaq Proposed Rule Changes, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg.
64,154, 64,180 (Nov. 4, 2003) (describing NASDAQ's changes to its Code of Conduct).
300. See David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 Amendments to the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic Integration of Business
Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 726 (2006) ("[T]he Guidelines require that
organizations establish an effective compliance and ethics program that promotes an
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law .. " (internal quotation marks omitted)).
301. Doreen McBarnet, After Enron: Will "Whiter than White Collar Crime" Still Wash?, 46
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1091, 1105 (2006).
302. Why this is so requires speculation, and competing explanations seem plausible, as
neither Sarbanes-Oxley nor related SEC regulations give specific guidance or requirements. On
the one hand, the codes are textual embodiments of aspirational corporate culture and thus
would not likely contain detailed rules; on the other, companies must promptly disclose waivers
of ethics codes, some of which likely will be uncomfortable to explain, and broad general
statements will minimize the frequency of waivers that must be disclosed.
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ethical principles also explains frequent talk among regulators and
30 3
politicians of the need to fight "check-the-box" mentalities.
2. Qualifications
The ethical hypothesis to explain the rise of principles-based
rhetoric seems credible, but two qualifications are in order, one
descriptive and one normative. Descriptively, such a call to ethical
rejuvenation implicitly assumes a decline in ethics during the relevant
period. Such laments recur periodically in history, and there is limited
basis for believing that a golden age of high ethics marked earlier
periods. 304 This is almost certainly so in the case of corporate,
securities, and accounting matters. While thoughtful scholars
30 5 it
conclude that the Enron era exhibited a decline in business ethics,
seems impossible to reach firm conclusions about that.
Normatively, this strategy of emphasizing principles in law and
accounting could backfire. Ethics code exhortations to abide by the
spirit of laws-a call to principles that can limit creative complianceproject a moral appeal that may be desirable. But for leaders to couple
such code exhortations with the rhetorical fiction of principles-based
systems could generate false confidence that resulting law or
accounting will cure the disease. The temptation, implicit in the
celebration of principles-based systems, is to imagine that rules should
be eliminated. My analysis suggests that this is neither possible nor
wise.
Finally, the relationship between the ethical hypothesis and
the regulatory hypothesis exposes another normative limitation. The
ethical hypothesis applies normative pressure to prevent creative
303. See, e.g., Le Pan, supra note 4, at 52 (giving remarks of Canada's Superintendent of
Financial Institutions, which note his office's regulatory effort to "resist the temptation to put in
place detailed new rules" and express concern that such rules can be counter-productive in that
they risk becoming a checklist . . . [at which point] their benefit is, at best, greatly reduced");
Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The Case for Reuniting Ownership and
Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 280 (2004) (quoting then-SEC Chairman William
Donaldson as saying that a " 'check the box' approach to good corporate governance will not
inspire a true sense of ethical obligation"); Harvey Pitt, Public Statement by SEC Chairman:
Remarks at the Winter Bench and Bar Conference of the Federal Bar Council (Feb. 19, 2002)
(stating that US GAAP is too "cumbersome and offer[s] far too detailed prescriptive requirements
[which], by necessity, encourages accountants to 'check the boxes'-that is, to read accounting
principles narrowly, to ascertain whether there is technical compliance with applicable
accounting principles").
304. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 259 (2d ed. 1984)

("[W]e still, in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack
any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view.").
305. See TAMAR FRANKEL,

TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA'S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A

CROSSROAD 37-39 (2006) (describing how the culture of fraud and abuse of trust in the Enron era
showed a society seeking to eliminate wrong by "redefining' and normalizing it).
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compliance and promote adherence to the spirit of the law. However, it
operates in the realm of self-regulation, in contrast to the regulatory
hypothesis that addresses external enforcement. In this realm,
regulated actors are content with the vague principles contained in
ethics codes, compared to the demand for rules that arises in the face
of external enforcement risk. On this analysis, pursuit of the ethical
hypothesis is unlikely to contribute greatly to increasing actual
compliance.
C. Political
A third possible explanation for rhetoric championing
principles-based legal or accounting systems is political. Descriptively,
this seems to be a stronger explanation for the prevalent campaign for
principles-based systems than the regulatory and ethical hypotheses.
Normatively, it is the most troubling of the three hypotheses-and the
most cynical, although it is not idiosyncratic. 30 6 Prescriptively, it
contributes to debate concerning the merits of jurisdictional
competition by raising questions not previously addressed in that
literature.
Literature on the jurisdictional competition debate, which
spans across numerous legal and other fields, is particularly robust in
the contexts that this Article addresses: corporate law, securities
regulation, and accounting. Contested topics include whether
competition exists, on what terms, and how to assess the results. The
following discussion of recent political jockeying supports the view
that competition exists among the actors in these contexts. Ensuing
discussion explains how these observations give reason to question the
efficacy of jurisdictional competition when the risk of rhetorical
overstatement is significant.
1. Jurisdictional Competition
The following discussion considers how the principles-based
rhetoric may be explained in terms of competition among (a) Delaware
and Washington, D.C. in U.S. corporate law, (b) British Columbia and
Ontario in Canadian securities regulation, (c) international accounting
promulgators and the SEC/FASB, and (d) various countries in a more
general geopolitical context.

306. See David Alexander & Eva Jermakowicz, A True and Fair View of the Principles/Rules
Debate, 42 ABACUS 132, 161 (2006) ("[Concerning rules-principles debate in accounting,] much of
the debate at the regulatory and policy level is at best vague and confused, more likely
disingenuous, possibly intellectually dishonest.").
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a. Delaware Versus Washington, D.C.
The jurisdictional competition debate was particularly vigorous
concerning the production of state corporation law in the United
States. 30 7 However, participants now mostly agree that, while there
may have been some form of competition among states decades ago,
30 8
the race largely is over and no or little current competition exists.
Delaware prevailed. Thus, the literature has turned attention to a
race of a different sort, replacing the horizontal competition among
states with a vertical competition between Delaware and Washington,
309
D.C.
In the new competition, Delaware corporate lawyers, including
judges, are in a political battle with Washington for hegemony in the
production of U.S. corporate governance law. 310 While this battle has

307. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 212-18 (1991) (debating whether state corporation law is a "race for the bottom"
and concluding that there may in fact be a "race for the top"); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism
and the Corporation:The DesirableLimits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1437, 1440 (1992) ("[S]tate charter competition produces a race for the top with respect to
some corporate issues but a race for the bottom with respect to others."); William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974)
("Delaware is both the sponsor and the victim of a system contributing to the deterioration of
corporation standards."); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 473-83 (1987) (summarizing and
critiquing the prevalent theories of jurisdictional competition); Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 709, 709 (1987) (same); Joel Seligman,
The Case for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 MD. L. REV. 947, 966 (1990)
("States will compete to design the most pro-incumbent management statutes as a device to
attract or retain incorporations."); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and
the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 289 (1977) ("The almost universal belief
that the competition between states for corporate charters works to the disadvantage of
shareholders is on its face implausible.").
308. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1778 (2002) (noting that the
"dominant view among corporate scholars" is that Delaware "has 'won' the race for
incorporations"); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553 (2002) ("The
dominant state in attracting the incorporations of publicly traded companies is, and for a long
time has been, the small state of Delaware."); William W. Bratton, Corporate Law's Race to
Nowhere in Particular,44 U. TORONTO L. REV. 401, 402-03 (1994) (citing "Delaware's position as
the preferred state of incorporation of large American firms in terms of relational contracting");
Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 679, 679 (2002) (challenging "the conventional wisdom that states compete for
incorporations").
309. See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking CorporateFederalism in the Era of Reform, 29 J. CORP.
L. 625, 625 (2004) ("The federal government, however, can serve as a credible rival to
Delaware.").
310. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 605 (2003) (quoting a
statement made in 1988 by the Chair of the Delaware Bar Association Corporate Law Council
that Delaware had to modify its anti-takeover laws to avoid federal incursion into the state's
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endured for decades, 311 serving as the fallback position to claims that
state competition yields undesirable results, the stakes have risen
since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where Washington
preempted numerous areas of corporate law that states traditionally
handled. Because provisions of that Act were widely lambasted as
would distinguish
rules-based, a competitive political response
31 2
principles-based.
as
Delaware's corporate law
Supporting the political hypothesis, Delaware's judges, unlike
their counterparts in other courts, played a leading role in this
contest. 313 Delaware judges frequently write articles that are
published in law reviews.3 1 4 While some of these provide thoughtful
analysis and reflection, in recent installations, the articles are
increasingly promotional of the Delaware judiciary's expertise, 3 15 extol
corporate law (including the claim that it is
the virtues of Delaware
"principles-based"),3 16 and harshly contrast those virtues with the
securities regulation (making the claim that it is
vices of federal
"rules-based"). 3 17 In at least some Delaware judicial opinions released
since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, analysis shows that the

corporate law). For a rebuttal, see Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem for
CorporateGovernance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 212 at n.19 (2005).
311. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1513 (1989) ("One result of Delaware's attainment of market share and market power through
the past adoption of suboptimal managerial rules is that Delaware now has a special incentive
not to lead in the adoption of such rules: the desirability of avoiding massive federal intervention
in corporate law.").
312. Cf. Kamar, supra note 72, at 1911-14 (attributing Delaware's victory in the state-tostate competition, in part, to its use of principles in judicial decisions).
313. See Fisch, supra note 73, at 1072-82 (exploring how Delaware courts are unusual in
other ways).
314. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of
CorporateLaw, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1603 (2005) ("[T]o a greater extent than is typical for
members of the judiciary, Delaware judges propagate their vision outside the court room.
Delaware judges publish an extraordinary amount of extra-judicial writing."). The authors cite
an "incomplete" list of some two dozen recent pieces. Id. at 1603 n.117.
315. See Griffith & Steele, supra note 9, at 11 (citing the "greatest difference between state
corporate law courts and a regulatory agency" as "the ability of the judiciary, in Delaware
especially, both to make and apply the law"). Mr. Steele wrote the cited article while serving as
Chief Justice of the State of Delaware. Id. at 1.
316. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism in the American
Corporate Governance System: PreliminaryReflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152
U. PA. L. REV. 953, 979 (2003) (trumpeting Delaware corporate law as "principles-based" and
denigrating federal securities regulation as "problematic" because it is "not part of any overall
system of corporate governance"). The two authors wrote the cited article while serving as judges
on the Delaware Court of Chancery.
317. Griffith & Steele, supra note 9, at 3.
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courts are attempting to respond to the political and competitive
318
climate that has resulted.
These developments reflect a different tenor of competition in
the vertical sphere between Delaware and Washington than existed
under the horizontal competition among states. The horizontal
competition between states, such as Delaware and New York, involved
products that are substitutes. The competition hinged on the
substantive products. Losses in the competition were not devastating,
with some would-be Delaware customers simply choosing New York.
In contrast, the vertical competition between Delaware and
Washington does not involve substitutes, but products akin to bundled
goods: a U.S. corporation wishing to be public must be incorporated in
a state and be registered with the SEC. The stakes for Delaware in
this vertical competition are considerably higher than in the
horizontal competition because Washington can preempt Delaware.
That means Delaware's leaders have stronger incentives to become
not only entrepreneurs but also a sales force. 319 This may help to
explain the increasing exuberance of Delaware judges in boasting of
their state's products. In this competition, the SEC has lesser
incentives to respond, and, in any event, its ability to stake positions
is constrained by limitations of the Data Quality Act that prevent it
from engaging in the rhetorical overstatement that characterizes some
32
Delaware judges. u

318. Jones, supra note 309 ("Recent Delaware court decisions indicate that Delaware's
judiciary has begun to respond to [preemptive threats] by adjusting its corporate law
jurisprudence.").
319. Delaware Supreme Court opinions often have been characterized by language more
common to sales literature than to legal analysis. E.g., Elf Atochem N. Am. Inc. v. Jaffari &
Malek LLC, 727 A.2d 286, 290 (Del. 1999) ("Since 1983, the General Assembly has amended the
LP Act eleven times, with a view to continuing Delaware's status as an innovative leader in the
field of limited partnerships .... The Delaware Act has been modeled on the popular Delaware
LP Act."). The Delaware Supreme Court rarely reverses its Chancery Court. See Griffith &
Steele, supra note 9, at 10 n.50 (acknowledging contrary evidence in the post-Enron years noted
in Jones, supra note 309). It almost always produces unanimous opinions. This is surprising for
law so often called indeterminate and thus suggestive of an unusual unity of outlook.
320. See Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L.
No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-72 (2000) (directing the OMB and federal agencies to
implement procedural guidelines regarding information they disseminate to the public); OMB
Guidelines for Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies; Notice; Republication, 67 Fed.
Reg. 8452, 8453 (Feb. 22, 2002) (directing agencies "to develop information resources
management procedures for reviewing and substantiating ... the quality ... of information
before it is disseminated"); SEC. & EXCH. COMI'N, FINAL DATA QUALITY ASSURANCE GUIDELINES
(2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/dataqualityguide.htm (describing the SEC's
procedures for reviewing information to maximize its quality).
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b. British Columbia Versus Ontario
Unlike the United States, Canada lacks a central authority
governing securities regulation. Instead, laws are promulgated by the
thirteen provinces and territories and enforced by commissions and
tribunals of the respective regions. 321 Each province uses
governmental securities commissions or administrators to oversee
respective provincial securities laws. The provinces may compete in
these terms but not in the same way that U.S. states competed for
charters. In securities regulation, there are no charters to fight over.
Instead, provinces contend for leadership in designing the regulatory
system, power to promulgate and enforce law, and power to contribute
to the national market system.
Provincial autonomy is threatened by ongoing efforts to
promote national consistency and harmonization of securities
regulation across Canada. 322 Provincial securities commissions and
administrators recently formed a national group, called the Canadian
Securities Administrators ("CSA") to provide a coordinating function.
Current forces are strongly in favor of moving Canada from its
existing fragmented structure to a federal system with a single
national securities regulator. This struggle implicates the balance of
power between the provincial and central governments and among the
provinces.
Some provinces, including British Columbia, resist the
centralized model because of the fear that it will be dominated by
Ontario, the money-center province that is viewed as inclined to follow
the United States, and its allegedly rules-based securities regulation.
Accordingly, the British Columbia principles-based securities
regulation proposal can be seen as a political gambit to resist
Ontario's power and U.S. influence. Supporting this hypothesis,
Ontario's Securities Commission replied to British Columbia's
proposal with a blistering comment letter 323 which, while
324
substantively meritorious, had overtones of a political response.

321. See

DAVID

JOHNSTON

&

KATHLEEN

DOYLE

ROCKWELL,

CANADIAN

SECURITIES

REGULATION xxxvii ff (3d ed. 2003) ("Table of Concordance"); MARY G. CONDON ET AL.,
SECURITIES LAW IN CANADA: CASES AND COMMENTARY 265 (2005) (discussing variations in the

laws and noting degrees of harmony).
322. CONDON ET AL., supra note 321, at 141-42. See generally WPC--COMMITTEE TO REVIEW
THE STRUCTURE OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA: RESEARCH STUDIES (Douglas Harris ed.,

Ottawa: Department of Finance 2003) (containing a collection of articles discussing the securities
regulatory structure in Canada).
323. Letter from David Brown, Chair, Ont. Sec. Comm'n, to Doug Hyndman, Chair, B.C. Sec.
Comm'n (June 27, 2003) (on file with author) (outlining objections to British Columbia's
proposal, saying it "has gone too far," emphasizing the need for the securities commissions to
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c. U.S. Versus InternationalAccounting
Some form of competition has existed for years between the
SEC/FASB and IFRS promulgators. 325 The SEC historically provided
international leadership on accounting matters, filling the lacuna that
326
exists in the international arena, which lacks a centralized power.
In this leadership, the SEC bears the costs of international regime
formation and places its cultural imprint on the process and results.
In accounting, the SEC and FASB use diplomacy to influence
promulgators of alternative accounting systems in a process in which
the SEC both exerts political pressure and succumbs to it.327
Promulgators of IFRS have been a potent political force in
these engagements and are an increasingly credible and influential
competitor to FASB. The SEC nurtured this role by initially insisting
that IFRS adhere to criteria that the SEC established. The SEC's
strategy was competitive, designed as "a surrogate investigation of the
prevailing culture of the [IFRS promulgators]. '"328 IFRS promulgators
responded by developing a robust accounting system, with one eye on
the criteria established by the SEC and another on the substantive
merits of particular provisions.
In the process, the IFRS promulgators developed not only a
system that the SEC takes seriously but also one that constitutes a
credible rival to U.S. GAAP. Beginning in the 1990s, these competitive
political realities pressured the SEC to accept IFRS 329 and prompted
work together and the importance of harmonization, but along different lines than those that
British Columbia proposed).
324. See CONDON ET AL., supra note 321, at 352-53, 388; Sukanya Pillay, Forcing Canada's
Hand? The Effect of the Sarbanes-OxleyAct on CanadianCorporate Governance Reform, 30 MAN.
L.J. 285, 305 (2004).
325. See Maureen Peyton King, Note, The SECs (Changing?)Stance on LAS, 27 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 315, 316 (2001) (noting that "[t]o date, the SEC has not accepted the IAS" promulgated
by the IASC). The organization has changed its name several times: formerly the International
Accounting Standards Commission ("IASC"), and currently the International Accounting
Standards Board ("IASB"). This is, itself, a signal of the competition between IASB and FASB.
326. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFrER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY 237 (1984) ("In a post-hegemonic world, the rules of international regimes
cannot be reliably enforced through centralized organizations.").
327. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1200, 1237 (1999) (noting that "adherence to GAAP has been a bully pulpit for the SEC and other
policy makers to champion improving regulatory developments in many foreign markets" and
summarizing numerous unilateral and bilateral SEC efforts to influence securities regulation
and accounting worldwide).
328. Id. at 1251.
329. Id. at 1208 (noting how rising stature of IASC during the mid-1990s presented the SEC
with a difficult decision concerning whether to recognize its accounting standards for SEC filings
and how the SEC therefore engaged with IASC, directly and through the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), laying out basic criteria it would have to meet
and providing a "stream of comment letters" on IASC proposals).
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the SEC to push for convergence. 33 0 In late 2007, the SEC formally
announced an interest in allowing SEC registrants to report using
33 1
IFRS rather than U.S. GAAP.
This background sets the stage for a political account of
prevailing rhetoric that operates at two levels of competition between
IFRS and U.S. GAAP. The primary competition involves products that
can be seen as substitutes: large multinational corporations may
choose which system to treat as their primary means of financial
reporting. To that extent, the promulgators compete by offering
substantive alternatives from which companies can choose.
The secondary competition arises from how consumers
choosing U.S. GAAP or IFRS are assured that countries worldwide
will accept their financial statements as complying with minimum
standards. The EU began mandating IFRS in 2005, and it is catching
on elsewhere, but it remains less widely used than U.S. GAAP (and
many countries that have formally adopted it, including EU Members,
have done so by amending it to meet local needs). As a result, the
majority of large corporations throughout the world still uses U.S.
GAAP or face investor pressure to do so, giving the SEC and FASB
33 2
continuing dominion.
IFRS must achieve more power to attract new customers in the
primary competition and to influence ongoing articulation of
accounting provisions in the secondary competition. It must both offer
a different product and persuade consumers-and other regulatorsthat its product is superior. Helpful to doing so is denigrating U.S.
GAAP as rules-based, while praising IFRS as principles-based. The
SEC and FASB return the volley either by explaining their version of
a principles-based system (the objectives-oriented model) or claiming
330. Cox, supra note 327, at 1202 (noting that "the SEC continues to promote convergence"
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, but faces "political considerations" in doing so).
331. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S.
GAAP, Securities Act Release No. 8818, Exchange Act Release No. 55,998, International Series
Release No. 1302, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,962 (proposed July 2, 2007) (introducing a rule that would
allow non-U.S. SEC registrants to file financial statements using IFRS without reconciling to
U.S. GAAP); see also Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Prepare Financial Statements
in Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, Securities Act Release No.
8831, Exchange Act Release No. 56,217, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,924, 72 Fed.
Reg. 45,600 (Aug. 7, 2007) (soliciting public comment on allowing U.S. SEC registrants to report
under either IFRS or U.S. GAAP). For some of the author's cautionary views on these proposals,
see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beware the Temptation of Global Standards,FIN. TIMES (London),

Sept. 11, 2007, at 11.
332. See Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and
Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 399 n.6 (2004) ("European companies generally use International
Accounting Standards (IAS), which supposedly promote 'standards based' instead of 'rule based'
accounting, but there is considerable pressure from U.S. investors for European companies to
conform to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).").
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that U.S. GAAP is principles-based as well.33 3 In pursuit of global
standards, moreover, the SEC considers formal recognition of IFRS by
offering registrants the option of reporting under either system-a
move that is a partial political response to the EU's earlier move to
mandate member-country use of IFRS.
d. Other Countries
Other countries may take up the principles-based banner as a
result of broader geopolitical realities. First, principles-based
sloganeering may reflect efforts to signal mature, rather than
developing-country, status. The self-enforcing model of corporate law
designed by Professors Black and Kraakman makes the case for the
necessity of rules in corporate laws of emerging economies. 334 U.S.
governmental representatives make similar cases concerning
securities regulation to countries such as China.3 35 It would be
unsurprising if countries publicized having principles-based legal and
accounting systems to signal maturity beyond the rules-based stage of
development.
Second, the label "rules-based" is used in national economic
policy to designate things like fixed exchange rates, interest rate
adjustments, and budgeting policy (such as the rule barring
government from borrowing to meet current expenses as distinguished
from funding longer-term investment projects). 336 In contrast are
"discretionary policies," flexible fiscal and monetary tools to influence
economic demand and smooth business cycle vicissitudes. The
International Monetary Fund and World Bank strongly favor rules,
especially for emerging economies. 337 But individual countries prefer
333. See supra note 177 (quoting FASB member Schipper to this effect). In the SEC's case,
constraints imposed by the Data Quality Act limit its rhetorical freedom to compete. See supra
note 320 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 212-25 and accompanying text.
335. See, e.g., Walter Lukken, CFTC Comm'r, Speech to China Financial Derivatives Forum
(Sept. 26, 2006), in International Developments: CFTC's Lukken Tells China Enforcement,
Flexibility Among Keys to Developing Market, SEC. L. DAILY, Sept. 29, 2005 (stating that
advanced economies need principles as in recent CFTC codification (CFMA)-but for immature
markets "a rules-based regulatory regime is essential").
336. See MIDDLE E. POLICY COUNCIL, JOINING THE GLOBAL RULES-BASED ECONOMY:
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE GCC,
available at http://www.mepc.org/

forums.chcs/20.asp (discussing whether the Gulf states are ready to adhere to the global rulesbased economy); Richard A. Posner, Creatinga Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13
WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1, 3-4 (1998) ("rules-first strategy" of law reform).
337. RULES-BASED FISCAL POLICY IN EMERGING MARKETS: BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS AND
PROSPECTS (George Kopits ed., 2004); TERESA DABAN ET AL., RULES-BASED FISCAL POLICY IN
FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, AND SPAIN 13 (IMF 2003); see also Pablo Zapatero, Searching for
Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, 24 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REV. 595, 595 ("[Tlhe

International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization have
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discretionary policies in order to retain autonomy. When rules are
imposed on emerging economies, it is unsurprising that countries join
a bandwagon, boasting that they offer principles-based systems.
2. Limitations
If rhetoric of principles-based systems is intended to
distinguish legal/accounting products, the impossibility of offering
such products makes the reports misleading. This byproduct of
jurisdictional competition is not explicitly addressed in prevalent
debates concerning the merits of this phenomenon in corporate law,
securities regulation, or accounting. But, if jurisdictional competition
can produce misleading rhetoric, it is possible that the otherwise
virtuous process of competition among regulators is impaired.
The jurisdictional competition model is contested but, when its
assumptions hold true, the model is plausible enough. The model, as
applied to corporate law, securities regulation, and accounting,
envisions regulators as producers of goods and investors as
consumers. 338 The model is appealing when a large number of
producers offers a complete range of goods, and consumers command
perfect information about offerings and can switch between them with
little cost. 3 39 Both visions require that perfect information about
products be available to investors and understood accurately by them,
a plausible stance to the same extent that relatively efficient capital
340
markets are plausible.
However, misleading regulatory characterizations weaken the
information-based assumptions of the jurisdictional competition
model. Ordinarily, imperfect information is ameliorated by
intermediaries who charge fees to "channel information to

developed a coordination structure aimed at achieving coherence in global economic
policymaking.").
338. The roots of the prevailing model of jurisdictional competition reside in one originally
focused on the production of public goods. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New
Economics of JurisdictionalCompetition: Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86
GEO. L.J. 201, 201 (1997) (exploring and refining original contribution of Charles M. Tiebout, A
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)).

339. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 338, at 222-36 (discussing the consequences of
relaxing the assumptions of the Tiebout model); Cox, supra note 327, at 1231-32 (citing Tiebout,
supra note 338, at 419).
340. In efficient capital markets, discounts are assigned to the securities of issuers in lesspreferred regimes compared to prices of securities governed by more-preferred regimes. Issuers
respond by relocating to regimes where no discounts are imposed. See Cox, supra note 327, at
1230-31 (summarizing but criticizing the argument).
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consumers."3 41 For example, in the state corporation charter
competition story, customers used corporate lawyers to provide
truthful, objective assessments of the alternatives. 342 Corporate
lawyers, securities lawyers, and accountants can serve like functions
within their respective specialties in the current competitions.
Yet regulatory misstatement diminishes expert ability to filter
information effectively. Indeed, especially in a competitive climate,
many professionals have stakes in the outcome, as where Delaware
lawyers or IFRS-trained accountants have incentives to echo official
regulatory pronouncements. Rhetorical overstatement also makes it
more difficult for professionals to communicate information effectively
to clients who are led, through public statements, to believe the
rhetoric. There are limited mechanisms to constrain or filter
regulatory misstatements. While the SEC is subject to the Data
Quality Act limitations that command regulatory accuracy,
promulgators of IFRS and officials in Delaware and British Columbia
343
are not.
Regulatory mischaracterization is a problem for all
philosophical dispositions implicated in debates over jurisdictional
competition. Proponents assume that government actors exhibit
business-like integrity, public interest theory views government as
benevolent, and even public choice theory portrays government as
responsive to private rent-seeking. Each of these accounts changes if
regulatory competitors are susceptible to the same kinds of
weaknesses of misleading statements that plague traditional business
enterprises. In such a case, integrity, benevolence, and responsiveness
are impaired. Thus, the jurisdictional competition debate may hinge,
in part, on philosophical views concerning relative confidence in
markets versus governments to promote social ends. 344 However, this
analysis adds a limitation to the theory's efficacy when sloganeering is
341. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 338, at 275. Professors Bratton and McCahery discuss
this point in the context of competition for factors of production, id. at 268-76, but this provides a
lesson concerning information.
342. See id. at 267 (observing that the literature on Tiebout's thesis notes that
"[vlerifiability... may be delegated to the judgment of a legal professional").
343. See supra note 331 and accompanying text. Indeed, sovereign immunity likely would
insulate states and state actors from exposure to liability for false advertising. See Coll. Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 666-67 (1999) (holding
that the state enjoys immunity despite making misstatements about a third-party's product).
344. See Cox, supra note 327, at 1231-32 (noting that arguments on behalf of jurisdictional
competition's virtues made separately by Professors Romano and Mahoney all display mistrust
of government such that the arguments are equally persuasive to support abolishing mandatory
disclosure or privatization of regulatory functions); Frederick Tung, From Monopolists to
Markets?: A PoliticalEconomy of Issuer Choice in InternationalSecurities Regulation, 2002 WIS.
L. REV. 1363, 1367-68 (noting the market-preferring orientation of devotees of jurisdictional
competition).

2007]

"PRINCIPLES-BASEDSYSTEMS"

1491

misleading and neither consumers nor their professional advisors can
be counted upon to overcome the rhetoric and uncover reality.
This additional argument does not mean that jurisdictional
competition is never preferred. Rather, it means that the presence or
risk of regulatory overstatement is a factor that deserves explicit
recognition in the assessment. It appears to exist in the three specific
contexts considered, making this a factor against unbridled
jurisdictional competition in these contexts. It is uncertain whether
that means that superior results would follow from alternatives to
jurisdictional competition, such as harmonization. What is certain is
the prudence of questioning the rhetoric invoking rules-based and
principles-based systems.
The foregoing theories of the rhetoric extolling principles-based
systems of corporate regulation are necessarily non-exclusive (as an
exclusive roster of possible explanations is essentially impossible to
state). But they are sufficiently capacious to be fairly comprehensive.
For example, the rise of principles-based rhetoric could be a backlash
against the evident demand for rules that existed during the period
leading up to the various financial reporting scandals. If so, this is
captured by the regulatory hypothesis, in that proponents seek to
reverse pre-existing trends favoring rules. As another example, the
rise of this rhetoric could be due to business leaders pursuing lobbying
345
campaigns that seem most saleable when dressed in that rhetoric.
This is captured by the political hypothesis, as these leaders promote
346
and exploit prevailing political rhetoric for their own ends.

345. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT (2006) [hereinafter

at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee
REPORT],
available
PAULSON
_Interim ReportREV2.pdf (report commissioned by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson,
Jr.); MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE US' GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES

LEADERSHIP (2007), available at http://www.schumer.senate.gov/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/
special-reports/2007/NYREPORT%20_FINAL.pdf (study commissioned by New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (NY)).
346. To illustrate, the PAULSON REPORT, supra note 345, strongly advocates "principles-

based systems," and yet prescribes rules in contexts where rules are better for corporate
managers than for investors or others. Examples include recommendations: (a) to abandon the
SEC's recently-adopted principle that materiality is both a quantitative and qualitative concept,
supra note 154, in favor of a rule that materiality means 5% of net income, PAULSON REPORT,

supra note 345, at 19; (b) to reduce uncertainties associated with the principles underlying Rule
10b-5, supra note 164, by the SEC providing more detailed prescriptive rules, PAULSON REPORT,

supra note 345, at 12; and (c) to stop using SEC enforcement actions to establish policy by
principles, supra note 271, and instead adopt formal written rules, PAULSON REPORT, supra note
345, at 9. For general criticism of the PAULSON REPORT along these lines, see Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Report is Muddled, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 2007, at 23.
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CONCLUSION

Rules and principles are imperfect categories to describe
individual legal or accounting provisions. While some provisions may
fit neatly into such categories, rational systems of law or accounting
partake of both types, resulting in hybrids located along a continuum.
Even when it is possible to classify individual provisions as rules or
principles, fairly characterizing entire systems as rules-based or
principles-based is an essentially impossible task. In addition to
examining all the individual provisions within the system, one would
have to account for how they are applied and how they interact. Once
those stages of a system are accounted for and the benefits
appreciated, it is difficult to conclude that any system of corporate
law, securities regulation, or accounting can be rules-based or
principles-based. Surveys of these fields warrant skepticism about the
accuracy of such descriptive claims.
Why global rhetoric championing principles-based systems is
flourishing despite this reality requires speculation. The phenomenon
is possibly due to a combination of a regulatory desire to provide a
counterweight to demand for rules, a quest to rejuvenate ethics, and a
desire to distinguish a jurisdiction's legal-financial products. The first
and second explanations seem credible and largely benign, although
they pose some risk of backfiring if regulators become overzealous.
The third seems the most descriptively accurate, but also the most
normatively troubling. If it is infeasible to establish a principles-based
system of corporate law, securities regulation, or accounting, then it is
misleading to promote the possibility. Accordingly, the labels should
be retired and regulators who use them greeted with skepticism.
Another way of concluding this analysis is to observe that the
rhetoric of "rules-based" versus "principles-based" as descriptions of
complex regulatory systems is simply an instance of the common
political habit of invoking binary classifications. Examples appearing
in certain styles of political discourse include the stunningly
oversimplified labels of "the right" and "the left," or use of the phrase
"both sides of the debate" when reducing complex disagreements to
oversimplified binaries. Political realities and positional complexities
expose such labels as contextually false dichotomies. Unreflective use
of binary labels in policy discourse retards rather than advances
thoughtful dialogue. In the case of binary classifications of complex
regulatory systems, this impairs weighing the relative advantages of
using available forms of provisions to achieve varying objectives.
If this binary classification hypothesis is correct, then a
modified approach to the vocabulary usage would be to allow the
simple labels to represent extreme ends of a spectrum. Complex
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regulatory systems could then range across the spectrum denominated
at its poles by extreme principles-density to extreme rules-density. A
classificatory scheme could be constructed in which systems are
identified by their descriptive positions across that spectrum.
Descriptive locations could include some terms suggested above, such
as principles-heavy, principles-rich, rules-rich, and rules-heavy. 347 A
challenge in devising such a descriptive spectrum, however, is that to
establish such locations requires highly sophisticated classification
and measurement tools that have not been developed.
If it were possible to develop a reliable classification and
measurement method to support such descriptive classifications, the
refined taxonomy could be useful. First, it would dislodge the
contextually false binary oppositions. Second, it would offer the
advantage of faithfully reflecting the realities that individual
provisions reside along a rules-principles continuum that is sometimes
unruly and that complex regulatory systems exhibit relative
vagueness with even more systemic unruliness. Reflecting these
realities in the discourse would rightly neutralize the rhetorical and
political power of the false binary. Third, it could improve capabilities
in relating alternative forms of provisions to objectives. Yet the
inherent limitations of a quest to develop such a model likely would
lead to the more ultimate prescription made in this Article, a fizzling
out of the vocabulary altogether.

347. See supra notes 210-25 and accompanying text (discussing how Professors Black and
Kraakman dubbed as "self-enforcing" the model of corporate law for emerging economies, which
devotees of the binary labels would be tempted to call rules-based, and I referred to as rules-rich
or rules-heavy); supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text (discussing how the proposed British
Columbia Securities Act advertised itself as principles-based, and I referred to it as principlesheavy or principles-rich); see also supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text (referring to the
"rules-density" of U.S. federal securities regulation); supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text
(referring to principles-rich contexts in which the SEC pursues accounting enforcement actions).

